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King Andrew I versus the Hydra-Headed Monster of Corruption: The Political Rhetoric of the Bank War
Mark Cheatham
The last thirty years have witnessed no change in the interpretation of the Bank War. The wrangling over whether Jackson deserved blame for the Panic of 1837 seemed to die with the publication of Peter Temin's _The Jacksonian Economy_ (1969). He argued that "[t]he inflation and crises of the 1830's [sic] had their origin in events largely based beyond Jackson's control and probably would have taken place whether or not he had acted as he did." Since then, no major historian has challenged Temin's main argument. As Daniel Feller pointed out in a 1990 historiographical survey of Jacksonian literature, however, the Bank War deserves more attention. The Bank War and Jackson's "own political significance as symbol and party leader need to be reevaluated" with regard to banking, which "became the pivotal issue of the second party system because it embodied people's hopes and fears for the emerging market economy." [2]
What this paper attempts to do is address at least part of Feller's challenge. It does so in two parts. First, it places the Bank War within the context of the market revolution paradigm that has come to dominate Jacksonian historiography over the past decade. Secondly, and most importantly, it examines the political language of republicanism used by both Jacksonians and Whigs and demonstrates how their rhetoric reflected their fears of and aspirations for the future of the United States.
In order for the Bank War to have occurred, the United States had to become a capitalistic society. Just how and when this change happened has been the source of much debate in historical circles. Two groups of historians, one supporting the moral economy and the other defending the market economy, have attempted to describe American economics before the American Revolution. James Henretta, the leading advocate for a moral economy, argued that "[e]conomic gain was important to [northern farm families], yet it was not their dominant value. It was subordinate to (or encompassed by) two other goals: the yearly subsistence and the long-run financial security of the family unit." Members of this system were not "motivated primarily by liberal, entrepreneurial, individualist, or capitalist values." James T. Lemon, the most prominent and out-spoken "market economy" historian, disagreed with Henretta's assessment of colonial society. While he acknowledged that individuals may have said that they were concerned with family and community, their actions indicated that they were more interested in "individual accumulation of property for the raising of their individual, not only their family's, status." Gordon Wood concluded that "[o]nly when the market separates itself from the political, social, and cultural systems constraining it and becomes itself an agent of change, only when most people in the society are involved in buying and selling and think of bettering themselves economically—only then can we talk of the beginnings of a market economy." [3]
The transformation of the American economy into liberal capitalism almost certainly had its origins in the colonial period, but the real changes took place following the American Revolution. The Confederation period witnessed the struggle of Americans coming to grips with a new social, political, and economic order. It was the struggle over a stable currency, taxation, trade, the cession of western lands, and war debts that helped convince supporters of a stronger national government to propose a federal constitution that would enable the United States to find a more viable economic position among the world's powers. While a number of Americans found reason to oppose the Constitution, the stage was set for economic expansion unheard of under the constraints of British mercantilism.
Political factions in the early national period held differing views about what course the American economy should take. Federalists supported the economic program of George Washington's Secretary of Treasury, Alexander Hamilton. In the financial reports he submitted to Congress, Hamilton proposed the establishment of a national bank, a publicly-funded debt, and mercantile capital to stabilize the national economy and government and establish its credit. He saw the United States in progressive terms, looking forward to the changes that "development over time" would bring. The changes he proposed would promote industrialization. This, in turn, would give jobs to those who had none and allow Americans to produce for the world's markets. [4]
Republicans, on the other hand, called for a different approach to the American economy. Instead of development over time, they desired "development over space." The size of the North American continent promised to disperse the burgeoning population, ensure the agricultural foundation of the country, and stave off the next stage of civilization, which Republicans saw as the final step of decay. To achieve this result, Americans would have to produce agricultural products for domestic markets or, if more markets were needed, make luxury goods for foreign markets. Industrialization would occur but only on a small scale. [5]
What is important about this debate for our purposes is the language both parties used to defend their economic decisions. Federalists and Republicans incorporated the classical republican language employed by Americans during the revolutionary period. Republicanism, as historians have labeled this ideology, emphasized a citizenry, typically made up of farmers, committed to a virtuous existence in a small, uncorrupted republic. Liberty, corruption, virtue—these were the buzzwords of republican ideology. Colonists had used this language to justify their rebellion against Britain's tyrannical monarchy and corrupt Parliament in the 1770s. After winning their independence, Americans continued to employ these words to describe the struggle over the Constitution's ratification and the early political fights of the 1790s. [6]
As applied to the American political economy of the 1790s, republican language centered on the debate over the meaning of virtue and luxury. Federalists argued that "it was only when individual citizens pursued their own best interests, and those interests were combined with the interests of others, that the goals of the general public could be served." In their analysis, virtue was defined as hard work that was rewarded in monetary terms. Luxury, therefore, was something to desire because it indicated the ability to purchase consumer goods, which could only occur in a society that was progressing. Republicans differed over the description of both terms. Virtue, in their estimation, consisted of private morality, which exhibited itself in caring for the good of the whole community over one's own desires. Luxury was the source of corruption for them. Because it indicated laziness and avarice, Republicans warned against pursuing, indulging in, and displaying luxury. It was to be avoided at all costs, or the nation would suffer. [7]
The argument over the meaning of these words continued until the War of 1812. This military conflict marked the end of classical republicanism, according to Drew McCoy and Steven Watts, and the transition to liberal capitalism and the market revolution. The administrations of James Madison and James Monroe witnessed the introduction of the Second Bank of the United States (BUS), the implementation of internal improvements, and an increase in the national debt. Luxury became a more accepted commodity for Americans to pursue as postwar prosperity seemed imminent. [8]
Richard E. Ellis argued that, following the War of 1812, Jeffersonians, or National Republicans, aided the development of the market revolution through the American System. They wanted to create "a diversified economy that balanced agriculture, manufactures, and commerce." Each region of the country would produce goods and services suited to its own resources. The result would be an integrated whole that would reduce or eliminate sectional and class conflicts. A national bank was central to this economic plan. [9]
The "Era of Good Feelings," as historians have labeled this period, failed to deliver on the promised prosperity. The Panic of 1819 shook the foundations of the American economy and sent tremors throughout the nation as Americans sought refuge from its effects. A financial depression had set in across Europe following the Napoleonic Wars, but the United States avoided the consequences from 1815-1818 because of a boom in land availability and in cotton prices. When cotton prices fell and the land boom imploded, Americans looked for a scapegoat. In this instance, the BUS fit the bill. [10]
The Bank, under the direction of William Jones, received legitimate blame for precipitating the panic. Jones overlooked corruption in its branches and actively participated in questionable activities. When Jones resigned, his replacement, Langdon Cheves, was forced to take drastic action to rein in the inflation that the Bank had helped to produce. The resulting calling-in of loans, foreclosing on mortgages, and tightening of the money supply set off a wave of bankruptcy and unemployment. [11]
Westerners in particular felt the harsh consequences. Kentucky, the state that "would play a significant role in determining [Andrew] Jackson's bank policy after he was elected President," divided over reaction to the panic and the role of the Bank in producing it. In Tennessee, the legislature levied a tax against any outside bank that attempted to establish a branch within its borders. Across the western states, Americans responded to the panic with fear and anger. Many times, they turned their vitriol against the Bank. [12]
Andrew Jackson's reaction to a proposed BUS branch in Tennessee prefigured his future response. He had not always opposed the Bank or even banks in general. Even after losing thousands of dollars because of bad financial decisions, Jackson had periodically supported the institutions. When an attempt was made to bring a branch of the BUS to Nashville, however, Jackson responded with language similar to that used by classical republicans. A "secrete and combined movement of the aristocracy" intended "to introduce a branch of the united states Bank, which would drain the state of its specie to the amount of its profits for the support and prosperity of other places, and the Lords, Dukes and Ladies of foreign countries who held the greater part of its stock." The implication was that the BUS existed for the benefit of foreigners, not Americans. Since foreign stockholders were not a part of the republican system, how could they possibly know what decisions to make that would benefit the United States? [13]
The events of the early 1820s seemed to bear out Jackson's warning. Members of Congress regularly accepted bribes and financial kickbacks from corporations in return for legislative favors. Even Monroe's cabinet members became involved in shady financial dealings. Secretary of War John C. Calhoun was involved in questionable transactions with the Board of Indian Trade, while Secretary of Treasury William H. Crawford was implicated in an illegal scheme to assist a branch of the BUS in Ohio. [14]
This alleged (and real) corruption apparently motivated Jackson, at least in part, to seek the presidency in 1824. His main biographer contends that Jackson was concerned that corruption and intrigue were overtaking the national government. A "corrupt, and venal administration" would "deprive the people of their liberties" if steps were not taken quickly. "[T]he people alone by their Virtue," he asserted, could protect the political system from collapse. When he lost the election to John Quincy Adams in the House of Representatives, Jackson accused Adams and Henry Clay of a "corrupt bargain" to steal the presidency away from the people (and him). In the years before the 1828 presidential election, Jackson and his Tennessee advisers, the Nashville Junto, worked to place him in a position to win the White House and reform politics in Washington, D.C. [15]
Jackson's victory in 1828 gave him access to the power that he needed to "cleanse the Aegean stables" of the nation's capital. Jackson spent most of his first administration, however, battling problems among his advisers concerning the Eaton affair [16]. The BUS was never far from his mind, though. Although Jackson initially indicated to the Bank's president, Nicholas Biddle, that he bore no particular ill will toward the institution, his mind changed as reports came from Kentucky that the Louisville and Lexington branches of the BUS had deliberately supported Adams and refused loans to Jackson's allies during the 1828 election. After an investigation, Biddle reported that no illegalities had taken place. The accusations in Kentucky were followed by more allegations of wrongdoing in New Hampshire. Once again, Biddle concluded that it was a misunderstanding and dismissed any further talk of improper influence. [17]
Jackson did not immediately act against the Bank. In his first annual message, delivered in December 1829, he gave only two paragraphs to the subject. These two paragraphs, however, questioned "the constitutionality and the expediency of the law" that had created the BUS and suggested that an alternative might suit the nation better. The section hardly indicated the rancor that would permeate later rhetoric, but it gave Biddle fair warning that Jackson was closely watching his bank. The president recognized the effect that his comment would have on Bank supporters "who prize[d] self-interest more than the perpetuity of our liberty, and the blessings of a free republican government." [18]
The president's second annual message, coming during a year in which Congress had reaffirmed the importance and soundness of the BUS, was tinged slightly with republican symbolism. "Nothing has occurred to lessen in any degree the dangers which many of our citizens apprehend from that institution as at present organized," the message read. The BUS should "be shorn of the influence" that allowed it to "[operate] on the hopes, fears, or interests of large masses of the community." Its continuation would only lead to "occasional collisions with the local authorities and perpetual apprehension and discontent on the part of the States and the people." While not explicit about the danger the BUS allegedly posed to the American economy, the use of the words "fear," "apprehension," and "discontent" suggested that the Bank was becoming a menace in Jackson’s mind. [19]
Whatever his intention in 1830, Jackson did little to disrupt the Bank's continued existence the next year. Distracted by the breakup of his cabinet over the Eaton affair, the president seems to have given little real thought to the future of the BUS. His third annual message agreed to let Congress decide the issue. Biddle, in return, failed to grasp the conciliatory branch that Jackson had extended to him. He continued to authorize the publication of newspaper articles defending the Bank against what he viewed as unwarranted attacks by the administration. When warned that his actions simply reinforced Jacksonian charges that the Bank was inappropriately involved in politics, Biddle refused to heed the counsel given and plunged ahead in his righteous cause by requesting that Congress recharter the BUS in 1832. [20]
That was Biddle's fatal mistake. If Jackson needed ammunition to fuel his fear of a conspiracy against himself and the American political system, this proved sufficient. Biddle not only was forcing recharter of the Bank four years prior to the expiration of its contract, he was doing so during an election year. He expected the president to acquiesce to the demand once Congress rechartered the BUS. Any attempt to veto a recharter bill would likely prove the death knell to Jackson's election chances, or so Biddle surmised. To stoke his opponent's fires, Biddle implicitly threatened retribution if the president refused to go along with the recharter. "[I]f he means to wage war upon the Bank," Biddle wrote to Charles J. Ingersoll, "he may perhaps awaken a spirit which has hitherto been checked & reined in—and which it is wisest not to force into offensive defence." [21]
Pro-Bank supporters introduced a memorial for its recharter in January 1832. Anti-Bank Jacksonians leapt into action and, in the words of their Senate leader, Thomas Hart Benton, sought "to attack incessantly, assail at all points, display the evil of the institution, rouse the people—and prepare them to sustain the veto." They submitted a House resolution requesting an investigation into the Bank's dealings. When the committee, controlled by Biddle's supporters, returned a vote of confidence in the Bank's innocence, Jacksonians remained steadfast in their opposition to the BUS. [22]
Their surety wavered when the recharter bill passed in the Senate (28-20) and the House (107-85) during the summer months. Jackson, however, was there to restore any doubt that they might have entertained about his opinion. "Providence has had a hand in bringing forward the subject at this time to preserve the republic from [the Bank's] thraldome and corrupting influence," he confided to Amos Kendall. Indeed, the Bank veto message, authored by the president, Kendall, Roger B. Taney, Levi Woodbury, and Andrew Jackson Donelson, gave a clear indication that this fight would not end easily or amicably. [23]
"Is there no danger to our liberty and
independence," Jackson asked in his message, "in a bank that in its
nature has so little to bind it to our country? . . . Will there not be cause to
tremble for the purity of our elections in peace and for the independence of our
country in war" if the BUS was under the influence of foreign stockholders?
If foreign investors controlled the Bank's board and future, they could
"influence elections and control the affairs of the nation," the
president surmised. "The powers conferred upon its agent [are] not only
unnecessary," Jackson conluded, "but dangerous to the Government and
the country." [24]
The concluding paragraphs of the veto message were rich in the language of class conflict years before Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels published their _Communist Manifesto_. Republican language, however, also appeared in the form of an attack on the aristocracy. "Many of our rich men have not been content with equal protection and equal benefits," Jackson pointed out. "By attempting to gratify their desires we have in the results of our legislation arrayed section against section, interest against interest, and man against man, in a fearful commotion which threatens to shake the foundations of our Union." The president called for Americans to return to the "devoted patriotism and spirit of compromise which distinguished the sages of the Revolution and the fathers of our Union." Doing so would prevent the "prostitution of our Government to the advancement of the few at the expense of the many." [25]
The Bank veto message was a masterful work of republican rhetoric. Most of the message concentrated on the specific provisions of the Bank's charter that adversely affected the economy. Its assertions on economic theory were flawed and biased. Embedded within, however, was language that warned of impending doom if Biddle and his cronies were not stopped. This was where its real strength lay.
Responses to Jackson's veto message also relied upon republican catchwords. Senators Daniel Webster and Henry Clay led the assault against the president. Webster accused Jackson of trying to stifle the prosperity of the country by undermining the Constitution and attempting to seize sole constitutional authority for himself. "According to the doctrines put forth by the President, although Congress may have passed a law, and although the Supreme Court may have pronounced it constitutional, yet it is, nevertheless, no law at all, if he, in his good pleasure, sees fit to deny it effect [sic]," the godlike Daniel roared. "No President and no public man ever before advanced such doctrines in the face of the nation. There never before was a moment in which any President would have been tolerated in asserting such a claim to despotic power." Americans could not help but remember the Revolutionary generation's use of this very same terminology against King George III. [26]
Webster, in fact, made direct connections between Jackson's claims and those of past absolutist monarchs and despots. "On the argument of the message, the President of the United States holds, under a new pretence and a new name, a _dispensing power_ over the laws as absolute as was claimed by James the Second of England," he argued. "That which is now claimed by the President is in truth nothing less, and nothing else," Webster continued, "than the old dispensing power asserted by the kings of England in the worst of times; the very climax, indeed, of all the preposterous pretensions of the Tudor and Stuart races." Jackson's claim to power was "nothing else but pure despotism. If conceded to him, it makes him at once what Louis the Fourteenth proclaimed himself to be when he said, 'I am the State.' " [27]
In the end, what Webster saw was the disintegration of American society as he and his contemporaries knew it. "Social disorder, entire uncertainty in regard to individual rights and individual duties, the cessation of legal authority, confusion, the dissolution of free government—all these are the inevitable consequences of the principles adopted by the [veto] message," warned Webster. Jackson's message was a statement to be taken seriously if the United States was going to survive. [28]
Henry Clay found similar reasons to object. The president's veto power was not expected "to be used in ordinary cases." Jackson's overuse of the veto indicated that he was unacquainted with intent of the founders or was simply defying it. The veto, if used as the president had done so far, was "hardly reconcilable with the genius of representative Government. It is totally irreconcilable with it, if it is to be frequently employed. . . . It is a feature of our Government borrowed from a prerogative of the British King." [29]
Biddle also entered the fray, suggesting that the veto message was "really a manifesto of anarchy, such as Marat or Robespierre might have issued to the mob at the Fauborg St. Antoine." This allusion to the French Revolution and its Reign of Terror was especially appropriate given the Federalists' fear of Republican alliances with France during the 1790s. By using another republican buzzword, “anarchy,” Biddle called to attention the image of Americans running amuck in the absence of a controlling government. Classical republicans had frequently asserted that despotism inevitably led to anarchy. Biddle reminded his supporters of that possibility. [30]
Roger Brooke Taney, who was destined to play a pivotal role in the Bank War, interpreted the veto message differently but still in classical republican terms. The message "has been well received everywhere," he wrote Thomas Ellicott, president of the Union Bank of Maryland in Baltimore, "except by those who are interested in maintaining the great and corrupting monopoly which it has effectually and permanently put down." Taney continued, "[Biddle] has been very ambitious of bringing the institution into the political arena in order, it would seem, to appraise the government of its strength." The Bank, in other words, was corrupt because it tried to influence the nation's politics to its own advantage. [31]
The stage was thus set for the fall presidential campaign. The issue was the Bank. A vote for Clay was a vote for the Bank's continuation; a vote for Jackson was a vote cast against the BUS. Both sides exchanged barbs over who threatened the most danger to the future course of the country. Jacksonians pointed out Biddle's financial contributions to the political campaign being waged against their candidate as proof of the Bank's corruption. Biddle spent an estimated $94,708.25 in 1831 and 1832 defending his financial institution in newspapers. Democrats viewed this action as nothing less than direct interference in the political process. "If the Bank, a mere monied corporation, can influence and change the results of our election at pleasure," the Washington _Globe_ concluded, "nothing remains of our boasted freedom except _the skin of the immolated victim_ [original emphasis] . . . Let the cry be heard across the land. Down with bribery—down with corruption—down with the Bank." [32]
Jacksonian newspapers continued to herald the fight against corruption. "The Jackson cause is the cause of democracy and the people, against a corrupt and abandoned aristocracy," _Globe_ editor Francis Blair wrote. "When the company of British Lords and gentlemen asked the government to make them a present of some ten million of dollars," the Globe continued, "General Jackson said VETO!—_and our liberties and institutions are still safe_." The Vermont _Patriot_ declared that Bank supporters, "the rich—the powerful—the men who grind the faces of the poor, and rob them of their earnings," were attacking Jackson "because he will not uphold corrupt monopolies—because he will not become suppliant to the Aristocracy of the land!" [33]
The Bank's supporters also utilized familiar language to attack Jackson. "The will of a DICTATOR is the Supreme Law!," cried the Washington _National Intelligencer_. A Boston _Daily Atlas_ editorial attributed the veto message to "the whole kitchen cabinet—of hypocrisy and arrogance; of imbecility and talent; of cunning, falsehood, and corruption" and informed Americans that "[i]f the doctrines avowed in this document do not arouse the Nation, we shall despair that any thing [_sic_] will, until the iron hand of despotism has swept our fair land, and this glorious Republic, if not wholly annihilated, shall have been fiercely shaken to its very foundations." An editorial in the Portland _Daily Advertiser_ argued that "[a] more deranging, radical, law[-]upsetting document was never promulgated by the wildest Roman fanatic. The revolutionists of France went but little further." Jackson apparently was "preparing for a crown by cajoling us with the prospect of an equal division of goods." The editor ended with a warning. "Let it be remembered that every military chieftain, Sylla, Caesar, Cromwell, all have obtained unlimited and despotic power by pretending to be the sole friends of the People and often by denouncing the rich, and by cajoling the poor with prospects, which they never intended to be realized, or only realized with chains and slavery, and dungeons, or enrollment in the legions assembled to add to the power of the tyrant." [34]
The election results seemed to indicate that the people chose Jackson's banking policy over Biddle's. The president won reelection with 219 out of 286 electoral votes and 688,242 out of 1,262,755 popular votes. Robert V. Remini, the preeminent historian of the Jacksonian era, blamed Jackson's fight against the Bank's recharter for the decline in his popular majority. Given Jackson's three opponents in the presidential campaign (Clay, William Wirt, and John Floyd) and the past and current critical issues that his first administration faced (the Eaton affair, Indian removal, and the Nullification Crisis, to name only the most important), Remini's explanation seems too unilateral. What is almost certain is that some voters sided with Jackson and some sided with Biddle; the election was not simply over the Bank's recharter, as both sides said it was, but over a multitude of issues. [35]
Even if the Bank issue was not the determinative issue of the election (modern polling techniques were, thankfully, not in place), it would play a crucial role in Jackson's second term. Most historians credit the Bank War with being, in Harry L. Watson's words, "the central event of Andrew Jackson's presidency" and the beginnings of the Whig party. It was "in terms of party history . . . the single most important event during the entire middle period of American history[,]" and its antagonists would continue the war on the rhetorical battlefield of republicanism. [36]
With the election over, Jackson had to decide how to kill the Bank. Remini suggested that Jackson made up his mind about the course of action to take immediately after the election. It seems unlikely that the president would not have considered some alternative plan earlier, but, regardless, his advisers worked with him to formulate a strategy. Amos Kendall, Francis Blair, and Roger B. Taney formed the core group in the Kitchen Cabinet that would influence Jackson's actions over the next few years. The plan implemented by the administration was to remove the government's deposits from the BUS and let it die a slow death from lack of funds. The warning shot came in the president's fourth annual message, when he suggested that Secretary of Treasury Louis McLane would take steps to ensure that the deposits "may be regarded as entirely safe." Jackson notified James K. Polk shortly after delivering his annual message that "the hydra of corruption is only _scotched, not dead_ . . . [but] an investigation kills it and its supporters dead." He wanted Polk to organize an investigative committee in the House to look into the Bank's practices during the recent presidential campaign. [37]
Jackson discussed his plan with Blair in early 1833. Blair took an informal survey of the other advisers and discovered that many of them opposed removing the deposits. Jackson, however, would not be dissuaded. After the House of Representatives returned a vote of confidence in the safety of the government deposits, the president brought his cabinet together and outlined his reasons for wanting the deposits removed. He requested that the members answer five questions that he posed to them about what action he should take. McLane, who opposed removal, displayed the most reasoned defense of the Bank. "It has been urged against the national bank that it would be an instrument of power in the hands of government, to be used for political purposes," he noted, but "in adjusting the charter of the present bank it was endeavored to guard against such abuses." The real danger, McLane pointed out, came from the local banks. Jackson agreed with some of McLane's points, but he decided that the Secretary of the Treasury would have to be fired in order to accomplish the Bank's death. [38]
William J. Duane replaced McLane as Treasury Secretary in June 1833. Duane proved intractable when pressed to prepare for the removal of deposits. At one point, he informed Jackson that if asked to remove the deposits, he would have to resign. Duane's reluctance did not dampen the president's fervor, and he proceeded to ask Kendall to find state banks in which to place the deposits. After Kendall compiled a preliminary list, Jackson convened his cabinet in September and asked their advice. Most advisers were less than enthusiastic. The president asked them to reconsider and come back the next day. [39]
At that meeting, Jackson determined to press his argument. He had Taney read a paper that the two of them had composed during the summer months. The formal paper contained language sanitized by Taney in his revisions. The original draft, made by Andrew Jackson Donelson at the Rip Raps, Jackson's vacation retreat, was full of classical republican references. The president "entertains . . . serious doubts whether it be possible to preserve that high degree of purity and simplicity which constitute the only sure foundations of Republican institutions from the corrupting influence of" the BUS. "That allegations of the aristocratical tendencies of our institutions, and of their progress, are often thrown out to promote selfish and sinister ends is quite probable," admitted Jackson, "but it is not the less undeniable that such is the inherent vice of every political system, and too much vigilance and self[-]denial cannot be exercised to restrain the sinister aspirations of wealth." [40]
The above quotations were only a sample of Jackson's extensive use of republican symbolism and language. He went on to give a history lesson on the British example. "The alliance between church and state and the vast power they have again acquired [in England], with the national debt and pauperism which they have produced, shews that corrupt influence is as potent in suppressing the rights of human nature and rendering the great majority of the people miserable as the most unlimited sovereignty concerted in a single individual." The reason why this lesson was important was because "[t]he misnamed American system is this British system of corrupt influence in Embryo." [41]
The response from the cabinet members was subdued. In one instance, however, it was defiant. Duane refused to agree with Jackson's decision. After some wrangling between the two over whether the president had the authority to order the secretary of treasury to remove the deposits, Jackson fired Duane and replaced him with Taney. This decision prompted some of Jackson's opponents to add yet another charge to his list of tyrannical acts. They argued that since Senate confirmation was necessary to appoint a cabinet member, the president had overstepped his executive powers. Since Jackson had ostensibly done the same thing during the Eaton affair, Duane's firing caused few major ripples. It simply confirmed former suspicions. [42]
Removal began quickly with Taney in charge. The plan was to deposit future government revenue into selected state banks, while using the remaining money left in the BUS to pay off government expenditures until it was depleted. By December, the government was almost free from the Bank's financial grasp. The country, however, was not. Angry and seeking revenge, Biddle met with the BUS board and began a restriction on loans given through his bank. State banks, in turn, were forced to restrict their own loans to maintain financial solvency. All of a sudden, a strong American economy found itself in a recession. [43]
Biddle's retraction of BUS money had its intended effect. Americans clamored for the president to do something. Even Jackson's congressional supporters urged him to relent and replace the government deposits into the Bank. Jackson adamantly refused. The Bank's action, in his opinion, demonstrated conclusively how corrupt Biddle and his cronies really were. They were willing to bring down the nation's economy and, possibly, the government itself to maintain their control over its financial dealings.
One important outcome of the recession was the formation of the Whig party. Built out of National Republicans, Bank supporters, nullifiers, discontented Democrats, Indian removal opponents, and others who simply disliked Jackson, its name encapsulated the imagery of an opposition party set against the tyranny of a despotic monarch. Whig newspapers began referring to Jackson as “King Andrew I” to reinforce their image of him and their vision of themselves as defenders of the republican form of government. [44]
All was not lost for Jackson. Amos Kendall tried to rally a faltering House member by reminding him what was at stake. "Are you prepared to give up the Republic? This is a struggle to maintain a government of the people against the most heartless of all aristocracies, that of money," exclaimed Kendall. "Yield now, and the Bank of the United States will henceforth be the governing power whatever may be the form of our institutions." The argument worked, according to Kendall's memoirs, but other Jacksonians wanted a more concrete resolution to the problem. Several suggested establishing a new bank. Jackson warmed only to the idea of restricting the availability of paper money in favor of specie. [45]
When Congress met in December 1833, chaos ensued among the Democrats. Their leaders were unable to maintain party discipline, which allowed the Whigs to open a debate in the Senate over the removal of the deposits and the firing of Duane. When Clay demanded that Jackson turn over the original draft of the cabinet paper read in September, the president refused. Clay then introduced a resolution censuring Jackson for removing the government's deposits from the BUS. The debate over the censure resolution added to the acrimony already present between Democrats and the emerging Whig opposition. [46]
Clay led the attack on Jackson. He castigated the president for a variety of reasons, economic and political. Two of his comments bear particular mention. The first comment addressed an old issue, Jackson's extensive use of the executive's veto power. "We are in the midst of a revolution," Clay cautioned, "hitherto bloodless, but rapidly tending towards a total change of the pure republican character of the Government, and the concentration of all power in the hands of one man." The second comment warned Americans about their future if Jackson continued unrestrained. "The premonitory symptoms of despotism are upon us, and if Congress do not apply an instantaneous and effective remedy, the fatal collapse will soon come on," Clay argued. If that happened, Americans would "die—ignobly die—base, mean, and abject slaves; the scorn and contempt of mankind; unpitied, unwept, unmourned!" [47]
John C. Calhoun continued the diatribes against Jackson in January. He compared the president to Julius Caesar, who "forc[ed] himself, sword in hand, into the treasury of the Roman Commonwealth." Just as the Roman Republic faced an invading executive, so did the United States. These "artful, cunning, and corrupt politicians" sought power through deception instead of the sword. "With money and corrupt partisans, a great effort is now making to choke and stifle the voice of American liberty," the South Carolina senator warned. "When the deed will be done—the revolution be completed," Calhoun concluded, "all the powers of our Republic, in like manner, [will] be consolidated in the President, and perpetuated by his dictation." [48]
The censure resolution passed the Senate in late March 1834 and compelled Jackson to send that body a "Protest" message on 15 April. He defended himself on constitutional and legal grounds. The language with which he upheld his removal of Duane, however, was most telling. "The Bank of the United States, a great moneyed monopoly had attempted to obtain a renewal of its charter by controlling the elections of the people and the action of the Government," he began. Congress had investigated and discovered "[t]he use of its corporate funds and power in that attempt" and it was obvious, to Jackson at least, that the Bank was attempting the same tactics in the 1834 elections. "[I]ts corruption of the press, its violation of its charter, its exclusion of the Government directors from its proceedings, its neglect of duty and arrogant pretensions" made it necessary to remove the deposits. If the Secretary of the Treasury could not see the justification, then Jackson, regrettably, had to remove him to save the nation. [49]
Calhoun responded to Jackson's protest with his own accusations of improper government. He called Jackson the tool of a "mercenary corps" that sought to undermine the real will of the people. Calhoun mocked the president's claim to be the sole representative of the people. The reason Jackson held the people so dearly was "to prepare the way in order to transmit to them his declaration of war against the Senate, with a view to enlist them as his allies in the war, which he contemplates waging against this branch of the Government." Calhoun cautioned that "force only is wanting" for the president to put an end to the hostilities in his favor. [50]
The actual end of the attack on the Bank is not difficult to ascertain. House Democrats, finally in control of their own ranks, passed a series of resolutions against the BUS in April 1834. The first recommended that the Bank should not receive a new charter in 1836. The second confirmed Jackson's removal of the deposits. The third suggested that the pet banks remain in place as government depositories. The last resolution established a committee to inquire into the Bank's actions during the recession started by Biddle. Biddle defiantly refused to cooperate with committee members, lessening his waning popularity and support among congressional members and the American people. He was able to convince the Senate to conduct its own investigation of the Bank's affairs, but by the time the Senate committee presented its report in December, Democrats had won the fall elections and Jackson had moved to establish his own banking system. [51]
The consequences of the Bank War, however, were not over. A chain of events led to the Panic of 1837 during Martin Van Buren's administration, and historians have most often blamed Jackson for the depression. Robert C.H. Catterall credited the Bank's demise to the naiveté of the Jacksonians and Nicholas Biddle's vindictive decision to restrict BUS credit. Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., faulted Jackson with "accelerat[ing] the tendencies toward inflation" through his removal of the government deposits from the BUS and the placement of them in pet banks. Marvin Meyers agreed with Schlesinger's assessment. Richard Hofstadter claimed Jackson's actions "caused Biddle to create one depression and the pet banks to aggravate a second . . . [and] left the nation committed to a currency and credit system even more inadequate than the one [Jackson] had inherited." Bray Hammond, the most influential critic of Jackson's banking policy, argued that the removal of the deposits, the lapsing of the BUS charter, and the Specie Circular left an unregulated economy that culminated in the Panic of 1837. [52]
Peter Temin's _The Jacksonian Economy_ (1969) marked a transition from blaming Jackson for the Panic of 1837 to focusing attention on other factors. Temin argued that "a dimunition in the capital flow from England to America was the force that led to the crisis." Inflation from the presence of specie had more of an effect that the loss of the BUS as a regulatory agency. Robert V. Remini and John M. McFaul reoriented attention away from the economics of the Bank War and back to the political aspects. Remini viewed the Bank War as primarily a political struggle between Jackson and Biddle. He admitted that Jackson deserved some criticism for not replacing the BUS with a central banking or independent treasury system, but not as much as past scholars had given him. McFaul, like Remini, also emphasized the political importance of the Bank War. He found that it was a contest not just about economics, but primarily concerning morality. "The Jacksonians preferred to moralize politics," McFaul concluded, "while the Whigs attempted to politicize morality." Where the Whigs supported moral reform in areas such as temperance, abolitionism, and Indian removal, Jacksonians fought against the immorality of divisive states' rights and the Bank. [53]
James C. Curtis offered an explanation for the Bank War that fits with the republican language Jackson used. "To those troubled by financial uncertainties," Curtis contended, " 'monsters' stalked the American landscape, menacing economic stability, destroying family solidarity, trampling religious values, stampeding citizens, and breeding a species of corrupt, monopolistic offspring that, if not destroyed, would perpetually threaten traditional liberties." Indeed, Jackson would use the term "monster" several times in his correspondence. That word encapsulated the republican fears of corruption to which Jackson held. [54]
That was Jackson's real motivation—fear of corruption. Like the members of the Revolutionary generation, the Federalists and Republicans of the early national period, and even the Whigs of his own time, Jackson wanted to preserve the republican principles upon which he believed the country was founded. To do that, he had to fight against any attempt to subvert the will of the people. When representative institutions failed to maintain liberty, Jackson took upon himself the responsibility of protection by claiming to be the sole representative of the people. The economic stability of the nation was an important consideration because, without it, the political and social orders would collapse into chaos. A centralized economic institution threatened to accumulate too much power into the hands of a few men who did not have the best interests of the nation at heart. Leaving aside questions of financial profit, constitutional quandaries, and personal ambition, which certainly entered into his decision-making, Jackson's intention was to preserve the republican principles of the United States. [55]
Endnotes
1. See pp. 29-31 for a complete explanation of these interpretations.
2. Peter Temin, _The Jacksonian Economy_ (New York: W.W. Norton, 1969), 16-7; and Daniel Feller, "Politics and Society: Toward a Jacksonian Synthesis," _Journal of the Early Republic_ 10 (Summer 1990): 156.
3. James A. Henretta, "Families and Farms: Mentalité in Pre-Industrial America," _William and Mary Quarterly_ 35 (January 1978): 19-20; James T. Lemon, "Comment on James A. Henretta's 'Families and Farms: Mentalité in Pre-Industrial America'," _William and Mary Quarterly_ 37 (October 1980): 693; and Gordon Wood, "Inventing American Capitalism," _New York Review of Books_, 9 June 1994, quoted in Christopher M. Duncan, _Fugitive Theory: Political Theory, the Southern Agrarians, and America_ (New York: Lexington Books, 2000), 110. See also, Henretta, " 'Families and Farms: Mentalité in Pre-Industrial America': Reply," _William and Mary Quarterly_ 37 (October 1980): 696-700.
4. Drew McCoy, _The Elusive Republic: Political Economy in Jeffersonian America_ (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 1980), ch. 6 passim.
5. Ibid. Eighteenth-century political economists believed that societies moved through stages of development. Four was the number of stages most often utilized; these were usually defined as hunting, pasturage, agriculture, and commerce. Most political economists thought that the United States was in the agricultural stage. The debate between Republicans and Federalists was over whether the last stage was the beginning of the end for a civilization or the start of a time of unprecedented progress. See Michael Lienesch, _New Order of the Ages: Time, the Constitution, and the Making of Modern American Political Thought_ (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1988), for an intellectual, rather than economic, explanation of the American debate over stages of development.
6. The works incorporating the republican paradigm are legion. The three seminal works are Bernard Bailyn, _The Ideological Origins of the American Revolution_ (Cambridge: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1967); Gordon S. Wood, _The Creation of the American Republic, 1776-1787_ (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1969); and J.G.A. Pocock, _The Machiavellian Moment: Florentine Political Thought and the Atlantic Republican Tradition_ (Princeton and London: Princeton University Press, 1975). Interested readers should consult the following historiographical articles for other important works: Robert E. Shalhope, "Toward a Republican Synthesis: The Emergence of an Understanding of Republicanism in American Historiography," _William and Mary Quarterly_ 29 (January 1972): 49-80; idem, "Republicanism and Early American Historiography," _William and Mary Quarterly_ 39 (April 1982): 334-56; Daniel T. Rodgers, "Republicanism: The Career of a Concept," _Journal of American History_ (June 1992): 11-38; and Alan Gibson, "Ancients, Moderns and Americans: The Republicanism-Liberalism Debate Revisited," _History of Political Thought_ 21 (Summer 2000): 261-307.
7. Lienesch, _New Order of the Ages_, 54, ch. 4 passim.
8. McCoy, _The Elusive Republic_; and Steven Watts, _The Republic Reborn: War and the Making of Liberal America, 1790-1820_ (Baltimore and London: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1987).
9. Richard E. Ellis, "The Market Revolution and the Transformation of American Politics, 1801-1837," in Melvyn Stokes and Stephen Conway, eds., _The Market Revolution in America: Social, Political, and Religious Expressions, 1800-1880_ (Charlottesville and London: University Press of Virginia, 1996), 156-7.
10. George Dangerfield, _The Era of Good Feelings_ (New York and London: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1952), ch. 6 passim.
11. Robert V. Remini, _Andrew Jackson and the Bank War_ (New York and London: W.W. Norton, 1967), 27-8.
12. Ibid., 28-30.
13. Jackson to Thomas Hart Benton, June 1832, in John Spencer Bassett, ed., _Correspondence of Andrew Jackson_ (Washington, D.C.: Carnegie Institution of Washington, 1926-35), 4:445-6.
14. Robert V. Remini, _Andrew Jackson and the Course of American Freedom, 1822-1832, Vol. 2_ (New York: Harper & Row, 1981), ch. 2 passim.
15. Jackson to John Coffee, 8 March 1825, quoted in Robert V. Remini, _The Life of Andrew Jackson_ (New York: Harper and Row, 1988), 144; and Jackson to Andrew J. Donelson, 6 August 1822, in Harold D. Moser, David R. Hoth, and George H. Heomann, eds., _The Papers of Andrew Jackson, Vol. V, 1821-1824_ (Knoxville: The University of Tennessee Press, 1996), 212-4.
16. John F. Marszaslek's The Petticoat Affair: Manners, Mutiny, and Sex in Andrew Jackson's White House (New York: The Free Press, 1997) argues that "the Eaton Affair cannot be fully understood outside the social context of the Jacksonian Age. The battle over whether or not Margaret Eaton was a worthy female began with, and was impelled by, the period's attitude toward women in general" (vii). Marszaslek, however, also describes in great detail Jackson's conviction that his enemies were conspiring against his Secretary of War, John Eaton, and Eaton's wife, Margaret. Jackson believed that the corrupting influence in this instance was not the Eatons, but politicians who were intent on keeping him from governing by distracting him with petty arguments and accusations. By 1832, it appears Jackson had discovered a more menacing threat to the nation, and his own reelection, in the Bank.
17. Remini, _Bank War_, 49-55. Historians disagree about when the decision was made to attack the BUS. Bray Hammond contended that Martin Van Buren convinced other prominent Jackson advisers to oppose the BUS at Richmond in October 1829. (Bray Hammond, _Banks and Politics in America from the Revolution to the Civil War_ [Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1957], 370-1.) Henry Clay's letter to Nicholas Biddle seems to confirm that view. "Unless I am deceived by information, received from one of the most intelligent Citizens of Virginia, the plan was laid at Richmond during a visit made to that place by the Secy. of State last autumn, to make the destruction of the Bank the basis of the next Presidential Election" (Clay to Biddle, 14 June 1830, in Reginald McGrane, ed., _The Correspondence of Nicholas Biddle Dealing with National Affairs, 1807-1844_ [Boston and New York: Houghton Mifflin, 1919], 105.) Frank Otto Gatell disagreed with Hammond, arguing that Van Buren had nothing to gain at that point, even if he already held aspirations for the presidency. See, Frank Otto Gatell, “Sober Second Thoughts on Van Buren, the Albany Regency, and the Wall Street Conspiracy,” _Journal of American History_ 53 (June 1966): 19-40.
18. James D. Richardson, ed., _A Compilation of the Messages and Papers of the Presidents_ (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1900), 2:462; and Jackson to James A. Hamilton, 19 December 1829, in James A. Hamilton, _Reminiscences of James A. Hamilton_ (New York: Charles Scribner, 1869), 151.
19. Richardson, _Messages and Papers_, 2:528-9.
20. Ibid., 558; and Remini, _Bank War_, 70-4.
21. Biddle to Charles J. Ingersoll, 11 February 1832, in McGrane, _Correspondence of Nicholas Biddle_, 179-81.
22. Thomas Hart Benton, _Thirty Years' View_ (New York: Appleton, 1856), 1:235; and Remini, _Bank War_, 77-80.
23. Jackson to Amos Kendall, 23 July 1832, quoted in Remini, _Bank War_, 81. Lynn Marshall challenged the standard interpretation, found in Carl B. Swisher's biography of Taney, that Taney, not Kendall, was the main author of the veto message. Donald B. Cole's forthcoming biography of Kendall confirms Marshall's conclusions.
24. Richardson, _Messages and Papers_, 2:581, 590.
25. Ibid., 590-1.
26. Daniel Webster, _Works of Daniel Webster_ (Boston: Little and Brown, 1857), 3: 417, 435.
27. Ibid., 434-5.
28. Ibid., 432.
29. Speech in Senate, 12 July 1832, portions quoted in Robert Seager II, and Melba Porter Hay, eds., _The Papers of Henry Clay, Vol. 8_ (Lexington: The University Press of Kentucky, 1984), 552.
30. Biddle to Henry Clay, 1 August 1832, quoted in Walker Lewis, _Without Fear or Favor: A Biography of Chief Justice Roger Brooke Taney_ (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1965), 166.
31. Taney to Thomas Ellicott, 23 July 1832, quoted in ibid., 166.
32. Washington _Globe_, 8 September 1832 and 17 October 1832, quoted in Remini, _Bank War_, 99. The expenditure figure comes from Ralph C. H. Catterall, _The Second Bank of the United States_ (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1903), 265.
33. Washington _Globe_, 5 September 1832, 17 October 1832, and Vermont _Patriot_, 22 August 1832, quoted in Remini, _Bank War_, 100.
34. 6 September 1832, Washington _National Intelligencer_, quoted in ibid., 101; Boston _Daily Atlas_, and Portland _Daily Advertiser_, reprinted in Washington _National Intelligencer_, 9 August 1832, quoted in George Rogers Taylor, ed., _Jackson versus Biddle: The Struggle over the Second Bank of the United States_ (Boston: D.C. Heath, 1949).
35. Remini, _Bank War_, 105-6. Remini did not include complete popular vote figures in this early study. I have included the correct figures from his later work, _Course of American Freedom_, 389-90.
36. Harry L. Watson, _Liberty and Power: The Politics of Jacksonian America_ (New York: Hill and Wang, 1990), 135; and Remini, _Bank War_, 177.
37. Remini, _Bank War_, 111; idem, _Course of American Freedom_, 315-30 passim; Richardson, _Messages and Papers_, 2:600; and Jackson to James K. Polk, 16 December 1832, in Herbert Weaver and Paul H. Bergeron, eds., _Correspondence of James K. Polk: Volume 1, 1817-1832_ (Nashville: Vanderbilt University Press, 1969), 575. Richard P. Longaker, “Was Jackson’s Kitchen Cabinet a Cabinet?,” _Mississippi Valley Historical Quarterly_ 44 (1957-58): 94-108, and Richard Latner, “The Kitchen Cabinet and Andrew Jackson’s Advisory System,” _Journal of American History_ 65 (1978): 367-88, offer similar conclusions about Jackson's closest advisers.
38. Remini, _Bank War_, 112-5.
39. Ibid., 115-8.
40. The original draft of the paper can be found in Bassett, _Correspondence_, 5: 192-203. The final draft actually read to the cabinet is contained in Richardson, _Messages and Papers_, 3:5-19. The quotations are from the original draft in Bassett, _Correspondence_, 5:193.
41. Bassett, _Correspondence_, 5:194.
42. Robert V. Remini, _Andrew Jackson and the Course of American Democracy, 1833-1845, Vol. 3_ (New York: Harper & Row, 1984), 99-102. Duane's view of the removal of deposits is found in William J. Duane, _Narrative and Correspondence Concerning the Removal of the Deposits and Occurrences Connected Therewith_ (New York: Burt Franklin, n.d. [1838]).
43. Remini, _Bank War_, 125-9.
44. Michael F. Holt's _The Rise and Fall of the American Whig Party: Jacksonian Politics and the Onset of the Civil War_ (New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999) is the latest word on the development of the Whigs.
45. Amos Kendall, _Autobiography of Amos Kendall_ (Boston: Lee and Shepard, 1872), 416; and Remini, _Bank War_, 131-5.
46. Remini, _Bank War_, 137-8.
47. Senate speech, 10 December 1833, in _Register of Debates_, 23rd Congress, 1st Session, cols. 84-5, 94 [microfilm].
48. Senate speech, 13 January 1834, in Clyde N. Wilson, ed., _The Papers of John C. Calhoun, Vol. 12_ (Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 1979), 221-2.
49. Richardson, _Messages and Papers_, 3:87.
50. Senate speech, 6 May 1834, in Wilson, ed., _Papers of John C. Calhoun_, 12:311-2.
51. Remini, _Bank War_, 163-72.
52. Catterall, _Second Bank_, passim; Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., _The Age of Jackson_ (Boston: Little, Brown, 1945), 218; Marvin Meyers, _The Jacksonian Persuasion_ (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1957), 108-9; Richard Hofstadter, _The American Political Tradition and the Men Who Made It_ (New York: Knopf, 1948; reprint, New York: Vintage Books, 1974), 80; Hammond, _Banks and Politics in America_, passim.
53. Temin, _Jacksonian Economy_, 174; Remini, _Bank War_, passim; and John M. McFaul, _The Politics of Jacksonian Finance_ (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 1972), 214-5.
54. James C. Curtis, _Andrew Jackson and the Search for Vindication_ (New York: HarperCollins, 1976), 113-4.
55. In "Jackson, Polk, and Johnson: Defenders of the Moral Economy," _Tennessee Historical Quarterly_ 54 (Fall 1995): 178-189, Wayne Cutler contended that Jackson opposed the market revolution most notably through the Bank veto message. Donald B. Cole premised his study of Jackson's presidency on a similar argument of opposition to the market revolution. (_The Presidency of Andrew Jackson_ [Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1993], x). Taken within the context of republicanism, I think both historians are correct.
Bibliography
Primary sources
Books
Articles
Wood, Gordon S. "Conspiracy and the Paranoid Style: Causality and Deceit in the Eighteenth Century." _William and Mary Quarterly_ 39 (July 1982): 401-41.