El Manejo Diplomático: Efforts to Acquire Texas

Nick B. Gilliam Sr.

 “There is a time for everything, … a time for war and a time for peace.”[1]  These words, traditionally attributed to Solomon, have been associated with Texas since they used in the theme song for the 1950s movie “The Alamo.”  They are appropriate for Texas and the United States.  The time for Texas to join the United States could have been 1819, but it was not the 1820s or 1830s for reasons dealing with the internal politics of both Mexico and the United States.

In 1825, President John Quincy Adams’ Secretary of State, Henry Clay, persuaded Joel Roberts Poinsett to accept the position of Envoy Extraordinaire and Minister Plenipotentiary to Mexico.  Poinsett was, at the time, a Member of the House of Representatives from South Carolina and only reluctantly agreed to accept the position.[2] He had not been the administration’s first choice for the post, despite his fluency in Spanish and previous travels in and detailed reports on Central and South America.[3] On 26 March 1825, Clay instructed Poinsett to establish “foundations of an intercourse of Amity, Commerce, Navigation and Neighborhood” between the United States and Mexico.[4]  Poinsett had specific authority to accept the Sabine River as the boundary between the United States and Mexico in accord with the Treaty of 1819.  Two years later, on 15 March 1827, Clay instructed Poinsett to renegotiate the boundary between the United States and Mexico.  In 1829 President Andrew Jackson personally ordered Poinsett’s successor, Anthony Butler, to make a second attempt to buy Texas from Mexico.  The efforts to acquire Texas, however, started long before these formal missions to Mexico and were the subject of as much acrimony as the eventual admission of Texas to statehood in the 1840s.

France and Spain had each laid claim to Texas, as well as much of the North American continent, for several centuries.  The maps by Louis St. Denis in 1714, Guillaume de Lisle in 1718, and by Le Page du Pratz in 1738 showed the Rio Bravo del Norte, now known as the Rio Grande, as the border of the French territory, Louisiana.[5]   Neither France nor Spain was ever able to establish effective, lasting settlements peopled with either their subjects or people loyal to them, in a majority of the territory claimed. They transferred Louisiana back and forth in several treaties without ever clearly defining its boundaries.

   In 1795 Spain ratified a treaty with the United States in which each signatory agreed to protect the other from depredations by Indians living within their territories.[6]  By 1818 Spain, declining as a world power and facing revolts by the residents of  her American colonies, was incapable of maintaining sufficient military strength in Florida to restrain  hostile Indians, runaway  slaves and  an assortment of  scoundrels  who  took  up

residence in Florida and who used Florida as a base for attacking U. S. citizens and property.  In 1818 General Andrew Jackson, pushing his authority to pursue the Seminole Indians to its limits, attacked across the border of Florida to pursue the marauders and punish those who attacked across the border.[7]  He captured, court-martialed, and executed two British subjects, Alexander Arbuthnot and Robert Armbrister, on the grounds that they were inciting the Indians to attack the United States.[8]  Adams wrote what Samuel Flagg Bemis called “the greatest state paper” of his diplomatic  career in defense of Jackson, who had more than ample proof of the men’s guilt.[9]  Jackson then proceeded to seize Pensacola and the Spanish forts in Florida, which forced the Spaniards to negotiate with the United States over control of Florida and other territory and for reparations to U. S. citizens. 

The United States purchased Louisiana from France in 1803.  Even then President Thomas Jefferson’s administration claimed  the southwestern border of Louisiana was the Rio Grande, in accordance with Victor’s map of 1802.[10]  The United States Ministers to Spain, James Monroe and Charles Pinckney, made this claim in 1805.  In a letter to Don Pedro Cevallos, the Spanish First Secretary of State, they wrote, “Rio Bravo is laid down as the western boundary.”[11]  Henry Clay later reminded Monroe of his previous position.[12]  In 1818 and 1819 the Spanish Minister in Washington, Don Luis de Onís negotiated the Treaty of 1819, also called the Adams-Onís Treaty, with Secretary of State John Quincy Adams.  With the benefit of subsequently released documents, there is no doubt that Adams could have secured the territory between the Sabine River and the Rio Grande as the southwestern boundary of the United States.  G. W. Erving, United States Minister to Spain, claimed that he was successfully negotiating a treaty with Spain that would have set the Rio Grande as the boundary when Adams pulled the negotiations back to Washington from Madrid.[13]  Controversy has swirled ever since about Adams’ failure to gain Texas along with Florida.  Thomas Hart Benton, a western newspaper editor and later U. S. Senator, described the omission of Texas as a “great oversight.  The great importance of Florida  … threw away a gain that would have bought us ten Floridas.”[14]  Henry Clay, then a member of the House of Representatives from Kentucky, “brought a movement against it [The Adams-Onís Treaty] in the House” on the basis that it gave away Texas.[15] 

Adams’ defense was that he was the last member of President Monroe’s cabinet to hold out for gaining Texas.  His extracted memoirs, in an entry dated July 10, 1818, claim that Hyde de Neuville, the French minister to the United States, who served as arbitrator and go-between for Adams and Onís, urged taking the Sabine as the boundary and that Adams said that was “impossible.”[16]   Adams appeared sensitive to the western interests, whether this was because he was fearful of their political power or had an eye to his eventual election as President, cannot be determined.  It is also possible that his position was nothing more than a negotiating stance.  Monroe appears to have been opposed to the acquisition of Texas, per se.  Robert V. Remini relates the tale differently.  As he reads the historical record, Monroe considered demanding Texas from Spain, Adams was opposed, and Andrew Jackson cheerfully agreed to Texas’ exclusion from the Treaty of 1819.[17]  In 1815 Jose Bernardo Gutierrez de Lara claimed that Monroe demanded Texas as the price for support of the Mexican revolution against Spain.[18]

 Monroe, in turn, wrote Andrew Jackson: “Having long known the repugnance with which the eastern portion of our Union … have seen its aggrandizement to the West and South … we ought to be content with Florida for the present” he thought it impossible to gain the consent of the Senate to a treaty that included Texas and therefore did not want the territory west of the Sabine River included.[19]  Benton eventually apologized to Adams from the floor of the Senate, accepting Adam’s statement that he had been overruled on the issue.[20]

With Adams in the White House and Clay as Secretary of State, the decision was made to acquire Texas.  Precisely who decided is not apparent; the probability is mutual agreement.[21]  Clay had long supported acquiring Texas and Adams claimed he wanted to during the Treaty of 1819 negotiations.  Americans were streaming into Texas under empressario contracts negotiated with the Mexican government and also without the benefit of that patina of legality.  It is probable that neither the Secretary of State nor the President expected to succeed in buying Texas, because Poinsett’s instructions were to accept the Sabine River as the boundary if he could not get a line further to the west.  The stated reason for a different boundary was that the Sabine was too close to the “great western Mart” of the United States.[22]  Poinsett was further told to prevent Mexico from “denying to the Commerce and Navigation of those European States, any favours or privileges which shall not be equally extended to us.”  The President did not want “most favored Nation” status but preferred “the more liberal footing of reciprocity between the resident Citizen and the Foreigner.”  Immediately after being told to honor the Sabine as the boundary if he could not do better, Clay wrote, “Perhaps the Mexican Government may not be unwilling to establish that of the Rio Brassos de dios [sic], or the Rio Colorado, or the Snow mountains, or the Rio del Norte in lieu of it.”[23]

If the United States was to hold the land on the north side of the Gulf of Mexico, then access to that territory by commercial shipping was necessary.  Cuba held a strategic position at the eastern end of the Gulf due to the relative lack of maneuverability of nineteenth century sailing ships, which could sail no closer than ninety degrees to the wind.  The United States had no objection to an essentially impotent Spain holding, however nominally, the islands.  Clay foresaw the danger that Mexico and Colombia might jointly attack Puerto Rico and Cuba, as Colombia proposed later, with the intent of controlling Gulf shipping.  Clay was even more worried that France or Great Britain might attack Cuba and gain effective control of the Gulf.  The United States would “have just cause of serious alarm” should there be an attempt by any strong power to control Cuba.[24] Poinsett’s role was to persuade Mexico not to consider acquiring or controlling Cuba.  Poinsett reported back to Clay on 15 June 1825 that Colombia had proposed to Mexico a joint attack on Cuba but that the Mexican Congress had rejected the idea because of fear of Great Britain and a preference for attacking alone.[25]

On arrival in Mexico in May 1825, Poinsett found a multitude of problems.  The most significant involved Henry George Ward, the British minister.  Ward not only arrived in Mexico before Poinsett did, but he was also thoroughly anti-American.  A skilled diplomat, who reported to George Canning, British Foreign Secretary, Ward’s principal goal apparently was to stop any aggrandizement by the United States.  Representing a monarchy, he formed a natural alliance with the pro-monarchical party in Mexico.  The other major intractable issue was the chaotic nature of the Mexican government.[26]  This instability made negotiations difficult because of the frequent changes in top office holders and inconsistent policies and attitudes.

One of the last points in the instructions may have led Poinsett into trouble.  Clay wrote, “you will shew, on all occasions, an unobtrusive readiness to explain the practical operation, and very great advantages which appertain to our system [of government].”[27] Whether Poinsett traversed beyond the grounds of diplomatic propriety is debatable.  He was certainly accused of meddling in Mexican internal politics by the pro-British faction.

 Five members of York Rite Masonic Lodges in Mexico requested Poinsett assist in the application for charters, which drew him into the internal politics of Mexico.[28]  The charter had to come from the Grand Lodge of the York Rite Masons which was in New York.  There was already a vibrant Masonic community in Mexico at the time.  It was Scottish Rite and its membership included the most conservative leadership in Mexico: senior clerics, monarchists, and many senior army officers.[29] The Scottish Rite Masons were the prevailing political party called the “Escoseses” also known as the “Centralists.” Whether it was Poinsett’s goal, or even foreseeable by him, the York Rite Masons became the opposition political party, the “Yorkinos” who were subsequently called the “Federalists.”[30]  Being both the party out of power and that of the less influential people, the Yorkinos or Federalists, generally favored freedom and democracy.  Poinsett subsequently claimed that after the first year of the existence of the York Rite Lodges that he had no further contact with them.

Manual Zozoya, the Mexican Chargé d’Affaires in Washington under Augustin de Iturbide’s government, wrote in 1822 the United States “will be our sworn enemies and foreseeing this we ought to treat them as such.”[31]  General Guadalupe Victoria, who became President of Mexico in 1823 after Iturbide’s overthrow, described the United

States as “ambitious people always ready to encroach” and being “without a spark of good faith.”[32] By 1826 Lucas Alamán, the Mexican Minister of Foreign Relations, reported to the Mexican Congress that danger threatened the department of Texas.  He saw the methods utilized by the United States to gain territory as appearing “slow, ineffectual, … absurd and over time certain and irresistible.”[33]  He appointed General Manuel Mier y Terán to go to Texas and make a report on conditions there and to determine what would be required for Mexico to hold Texas.  Terán arrived in Texas in 1828 and issued his report and recommendations in late 1829 or early 1830.[34]  His ideas on how to maintain Texas as part of Mexico included: increasing the population of Texas by sending Mexican prisoners to settle there, promote colonization of Texas by people from European nations, encourage coastwise trade between Texas and  Mexico, remove state power over colonization (i.e. vest it in the federal government), and aid poor Mexican farmers in acquiring tools so they could emigrate to Texas. His description of the Mexicans in the Nacogdoches, Texas area as not of “superior character … exactly the opposite is true, the Mexicans in this town comprising what in all countries is called the lowest class – the very poor and ignorant.”[35]  With this opinion of his fellow citizens in East Texas, encouraging prisoners and the very poor to emigrate is surprising, since that social and economic level was hurting Mexican prestige in the eyes of the Anglo settlers.

In July 1825, Poinsett wrote Clay that “it will be important to gain time if we wish to extend our Territory beyond the Boundary agreed upon by the Treaty of 1819.”[36]  In March 1827, Poinsett was instructed to offer up to one million dollars for Texas to the Rio Grande, proportionately less for the intervening rivers as boundaries.[37]  The Mexican treasury was in such desperate condition that Poinsett realized that one million dollars would not begin to make a dent in the deficit and would certainly not attract a favorable response.  Rather than give unnecessary offense, he never submitted the offer.[38]  On 22 July 1829 Poinsett wrote Martin Van Buren, the Secretary of State of the United States, “I am still convinced that we never can expect to extend our boundary south of the river Sabine, without quarrelling with these people.  The majority of the Mexican Senate, elected during the reign of the monarchical faction … are opposed to the establishment of friendly relations between the United States and Mexico.”[39] Van Buren, as Jackson’s Secretary of State, had ordered Poinsett to reopen negotiations with Mexico over the boundary issue.

J. Fred Rippy and many subsequent commentators have assailed Poinsett  for poor performance as the United States’ representative to Mexico.  Considering the situation he inherited this is an unjust conclusion.  He did not succeed in renegotiating the boundary from the Sabine River to the west but he ably and successfully discharged his assignments in all other respects; no one could have effected a peaceable transfer of Texas at the time.  Unlike his successor, he did successfully conclude negotiations on most matters, in particular the treatment of United States citizens by the Mexican government and ably assisted American businessmen in navigating the conflicting and variable Mexican commercial laws.  The American nemesis, Ward, thought that Poinsett enjoyed great influence in Mexico.[40]

Poinsett, a traveler, a seasoned observer, fluent in Spanish was replaced by Anthony Butler in December 1829.  Poinsett was, regrettably, personna non grata with the Mexican government, largely at the instigation of the monarchists/centralists who controlled the Vera Cruz legislature.  Butler’s primary qualification for the post of chargé de affaires for Mexico was his friendship with President Andrew Jackson. The major historical question is whether Jackson authorized Butler to pay bribes to achieve the acquisition of Texas.

On 5 August 1829, Butler wrote to Jackson giving reasons why the United States should acquire Texas.  His seven points were: 1 - select a boundary between the Nueces and the Rio Grande that would gratify the Mexican government and achieve a wide separation of subjects of the two governments and multiply the difficulties of intercourse; 2 - the questionable character of the Sabine boundary; 3 - the advantage to Mexico of relieving it of the expense of defending Texas, and creating a more easily protected eastern frontier; 4 -  the compensation that Mexico would receive for Texas; 5 - the unsettled nature of the Mexican government and the high probability of her dismemberment starting with Texas; 6 - there had been four insurrections in Texas since 1825; and lastly to relieve their jealousy and suspicion of the United States.[41]

Jackson was in full agreement with the concept of acquiring Texas.  On 13 August 1829  he  wrote to  Martin Van Buren,  his  Secretary of State,  that  the objects of

acquiring Texas were: the safety of New Orleans, obtain more land for concentrating the Indians, and achieve a “natural boundary” that would not be the subject of dispute.  He instructed Van Buren to tell Poinsett to offer up to $5 million for Texas.[42]  Van Buren’s dispatch to Poinsett said: “it is the wish of the President to open negotiations without delay for the purchase of Texas.”[43]

Butler was encouraged from the outset by  Jackson to acquire Texas.  On 10 October 1829 Jackson wrote regarding Texas, “The acquisition of that territory is becoming every day an object of more importance to us … .”  Their “consciousness of their weakness, and inability to assert their power in that province” should have made Mexico amenable to negotiations in Jackson’s opinion.  Furthermore, Jackson wrote that Commodore David Porter, an American naval officer who had been hired by the Mexican government to organize the Mexican Navy, reported that “the Mexican Minister for Foreign affairs … has obtained a large grant of land in Texas.  This circumstance may be made to favour the negotiation for the cession, by stipulating for the surrender of this grant to the United States, at a fair price, as a part of the five millions proposed to be given for the whole province.  This must be an honest transaction.  I scarcely ever knew a Spaniard who was not the slave of avarice, and it is not improbable that this weakness may be worth a great deal to us in this case.”[44]  There was an additional private note which Jackson instructed Butler to burn after reading.  On October 19^th Jackson wrote, “I confide much in you[r] ability to conduct the negotiation for the purchase of Texas, which is very important to the harmony and peace of the two republics.  Its inhabitants will make an effort to set up a free government the moment they have the power.”[45]

By 15 March 1831 Jackson’s saw the situation in Texas growing more volatile. He wrote, “the most important step to the lasting harmony of the two countries will be a cession of Texas to us.  There is reason to fear that a project is already on foot … to take possession of Texas and declare it an independent republic.  A revolt in Texas may close the door forever to its [the United States-Mexican boundary] advantageous settlement.”[46]

The more farsighted Mexican leaders saw the situation in Texas as desperate.  In January 1830 the newspaper El Sol reported that Butler was going to attempt to purchase Texas for $5 million.  Whatever the source of El Sol’s information, it was accurate and timely.  Bernard Mayo charged that the information came from Butler’s boasting of his plans while in Texas en route to Mexico.[47]  General Terán said, as part of his report on conditions  in  Texas,  “Either  the  government  occupies Texas now or it is lost forever… .”[48]   Eugene C. Barker and other historians state there was a hue and cry in newspapers throughout the United States for the acquisition of Texas in the early years of the Jackson administration.  These essays were probably received in Mexico as official positions of the United States government, since the newspapers in Mexico were so closely allied with the government, or at least with one of the political parties, as to be tantamount to official government organs.

Alamán, then Mexican Minister of Foreign Affairs, in a report to the Mexican Congress, regarding the settlement patterns of the United States citizens in Texas said at, “precisely the present state of things in Texas, diplomatic intrigue (el manejo diplomático) begins.”[49]  By August 24, 1831 Jackson was more certain that , “if the boundary between us is not soon established (Texas) must be lost to her forever” unconsciously echoing General Terán’s report.  He included, in cipher, “Dr. Allemand (Alamán ?) is deeply interested in the large grants referred to.”[50]  These grants are not referred to in this letter but presumably refer to the grants mentioned previously in his letter of October 10, 1829.  Apparently Alamán was attempting to implement his recommendations to settle Texas with Europeans who might be more favorably disposed toward the Mexican government than that of the United States. 

Poinsett’s negotiated treaty of “Amity and Commerce” had not been ratified on a timely basis by both the U. S. and Mexican Congresses, as required under its own terms.  The Mexican congress was demanding that the boundary treaty specifying the Sabine as the boundary be enacted concurrently with the commerce treaty.  Butler wisely recommended to Jackson that the Treaty “should not be ratified.”[51]  With the unbridled optimism for which Butler was known, he added “I should not despair of inducing the present Administration to grant us all we desire… .I do not mean to assert that the ratification of the Boundary Treaty of 1828 will close all prospect of obtaining a different boundary hereafter, yet it will most assuredly multiply greatly the difficulties to be encountered in a negotiation with that view.”[52] 

On 18 July 1832 Butler wrote, “The amount to which I am limited for the purchase by my instructions, will very probably be in part applied to facilitate the Negotiation, in which case we shall provide for that portion of the payment by a secret article.”[53]

October 28, 1833 brought forth an amazing document from Butler.  He claimed to have had discussions with a “shrewd and intelligent man” who occupies a “high official station” and who advised “There is one Man who must be brought over to us in this affair [acquisition of Texas] … this man so important for us to gain must have himself 200, or 300 thousand dollars” and that some others would require “3 or 4 Hundred thousand more.”[54]  Butler’s general unfitness for the office he held was rarely made more apparent: he sent that letter unencoded through the mail!  Jackson replied on November 27^th strongly criticizing him for the lack of encryption and then denounced any and all efforts at bribery or anything that could be construed as such.  How the Mexican government might choose to distribute money paid it was not the concern of the United States.

Butler self-righteously responded on 6 February 1834 that “bribery is not only common and familiar in all ranks and classes, but familiarly and freely spoken of.”[55]  The principal question in all this is whether the Mexican senior officials would have been so easily bribed or whether this was a reflection of  Butler’s own venality.

 Butler did have a creative idea for gaining Texas.  He suggested that the United States government should lend Mexico $5 million, secured by a chattel mortgage on Texas.[56]  A fallback option was to arrange for a loan to Mexico from non-governmental sources but with the same security.  Since the Mexican government could not possibly repay the loan, Texas could simply be foreclosed on.  Jackson rejected this scheme as illegal: there was no authority for the United States government to make such a loan.

Butler’s overwhelming egotism and undue optimism would be funny if they were not so sad.  He advised that the negotiations to acquire Texas were going well and would soon be successfully concluded in 1830, 1832, 1833, 1834, and 1835.

On 2 January 1832 Butler wrote, “I should not despair of inducing the present administration to grant us all we desire.”  The next July 18^th he wrote, “I find him [Alamán] much better disposed on the question, than my most sanguine hopes allowed me [to] anticipate, for although I never doubted being able to put him right eventually.  I must so contrive as to have him the sole Negotiator on the part of Mexico … in which event I have strong faith in settling the Treaty within 10 days.”[57]  Butler subsequently claimed to have been approached by Father Ignacio Hernandez, a personal agent for, and confidante of Santa Anna, who suggested that an arrangement could be made with Santa Anna for Texas.  Butler, recognizing a kindred spirit, wrote, “Santa Anna is a vile hypocrite, and a most unprincipled Man.  You can have no hold on his Moral principles because he is without any.”[58]

On 2 July 1832 Butler sent Secretary of State Edward Livingston what he claimed were minutes of a conversation he had with Lucas Alamán regarding a new boundary between the United States and Mexico.  Butler’s arguments for renegotiating were the uprisings that occurred and would reoccur in Texas, the Mexican treasury was bankrupt and could not reimburse North American settlers in Texas for the improvements they had made if it tried to buy them out, that at some point a revolt by the Texans would be successful and Mexico would get nothing, and even if Mexico defeated a revolt, it could not afford to station troops there permanently.  Their second conversation, supposedly with maps spread out in front of them, occurred 8 days later.[59]  Butler was, as always, convinced that he was close to an agreement.

On 9 March 1830 Butler sent another optimistic report to Van Buren, this time including Alamán’s address to the Mexican Congress where he said,  “How can she [Mexico] part with two hundred fifty leagues of coast?  Should Mexico commit such error, she would degrade herself from the highest rank among the American nations.”[60]  Despite these strong, public words, Butler continued to think he could negotiate successfully for the cession of Texas with Alamán.

Butler may have really believed that he had Jackson’s approval for the bribes he proposed.  In October 1833 Butler wrote “recollecting that you had authorised me to employ the amount designed for this object (acquisition of Texas) in any way which according to my discretion was best calculated to effect our purpose.”[61] In February 1834

he wrote, “More than two years since I wrote informing you that the best if not the only mode of attaining our object in relation to Texas would be to interest certain persons here through the application of money to lend their aid.”[62] Jackson wrote the classic endorsement on the bottom of this letter, “What a Scamp!”[63] Sam Houston described Butler as “a much worse man than anyone body else.”[64]

Most historians have agreed with Jackson in generally disapproving of and denigrating Butler.  The notable exception is Richard R. Stenberg, although his writings appear to be more animated by a loathing of Andrew Jackson than approval of Butler.  Stenberg argues strongly that Jackson had no discomfort with bribery, only with being even potentially associated with it.[65]  This view and Butler’s claim of being authorized to make sub rosa payments are hard to square with Jackson’s written instructions, quoted above “This must be an honest transaction.”  If that phrase is dropped or ignored from Jackson’s original letter, and it is assumed that Jackson’s letter of 27 November 1833 was written not to Butler but for posterity, then Stenberg’s position is reasonable. 

The key to the failure of the United States to acquire Texas peaceably in the 1820s and 1830s was Mexico’s political unwillingness and inability to cede territory for any reason.  The institutions of government were weak and the party in power at any time was perpetually subject to attack, both political and military, by the internal opposition.  Although Mexico had some able and farsighted statesmen, they could or would not face the certain consequences of facts they knew: Texas’ population was majority Anglo and holding Texas would be impossible.  Poinsett summarized it well in 1827 when he wrote, “Their extreme vanity [Mexican government] would be diverting, if it were not likely to be attended with such injurious effects.”[66]

The failure of diplomacy produced the typical result: war.  Both the War for Texas Independence and the Mexican-American War of 1846 could have been averted had the diplomats succeeded in a peaceable transfer of Texas.

Endnotes

Bibliography

Primary Sources:

  Bassett, John Spencer, ed., Correspondence of Andrew Jackson (Washington: Carnegie Institution of Washington, 1926.  Reprint, New York: Kraus reprints, 1969.

  Benton, Thomas Hart. Thirty Years’ View; or A History of the Working of the American Government for Thirty Years, from 1820 to 1850.  New York: D. Appleton and Co., 1886.

  Butler, Anthony to Martin Van Buren, Secretary of State, 9 March 1830, House of Representatives Document 351.

  _____ to Andrew Jackson, President of the United States, 23 December 1831, House of Representatives Document 351.

  _____ to Louis McLane, Secretary of State. 5 August 1833, House of Representatives Document 351.

  Clay, Henry.  Papers of Henry Clay.  James F. Hopkins, ed. Lexington, Ky. University of Kentucky Press, 1972. Vol. 1-6. 

  _____ Papers of Henry Clay.  Robert Seager II, ed. Lexington, Ky. University of Kentucky Press, 1972. Vol. 7-8. 

 Garcia, Carlos to Anthony Butler, Minister to Mexico, 21 June 1833 House of Representatives Document 351.

  Gonzalez, Bernardo to Anthony Butler Minister to Mexico, 2 March 1833, House of Representatives Document 351.

  Jackson, Andrew. Opinions of Gen. Andrew Jackson on the Annexation of Texas. no publisher, 1844

  de Lisle, Guillaume.  Carte de la Louisiane et du cours du Mississipi. Paris, 1718

  Melish, John. A Geographical Description of the World, intended as an accompaniment to the Map of the World on Mercator Projection. Philadelphia: Melish and Harrison, 1818

  _____ A Map of the World. 1818

  _____A Geographical Description of the United States, with the contiguous British and Spanish possessions, intended as an accompaniment to Melish’s Map of these countries, 2d ed. (Philadelphia: by the author, 1816)

  Onís y Gonzales, Luis de to John Quincy Adams, Secretary of State, 17 June 1818, American State Papers Foreign Relations, Volume 4, p.495.

  _____ to John Quincy Adams, Secretary of State, 24 October 1818, American State Papers Foreign Relations, Volume 4, p.526.

  Poinsett, Joel Roberts to Henry Clay, Secretary of State, 21 May 1828, House of Representatives Document 351

  _____ to Martin Van Buren, Secretary of State 22 July 1829 House of Representatives Document 351

  Van Buren, Martin.  Papers of Martin Van Buren Washington: Library of Congress, 1960. microfilm

  _____ Letter of Mr. Van Buren on Texas. Columbus, Ohio. 1844, microfilm

  Secondary sources:

  Andrew, Bunyan H. “Some Queries concerning the Texas-Louisiana Sabine Boundary.” Southwestern Historical Quarterly  53 no.1 (July 1949): 1-18

  Barker, Eugene C. Mexico and Texas 1821-1835.   first pub. 1928, reprint, New York: Russell & Russell 1965

  Belohlavek, John M. Let the Eagle Soar! the Foreign Policy of Andrew Jackson. Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1985

Bemis, Samuel Flagg. John Quincy Adams and the Foundations of American Foreign Policy. New York: Knopf, 1949.

  Brooks, Philip Coolidge. Diplomacy and the Borderlands: The Adams-Onis Treaty of 1819. New York: Octagon Books, 1970.

  Callahan, James M. American Foreign Policy in Mexican Relations. New York: Macmillan, 1932.

  Cox, Isaac Joslin. “The Southwest boundary of Texas.” Southwestern Historical Quarterly VI (October 1902): 81-102

  _____ “Louisiana Texas Frontier.” Southwestern Historical Quarterly X (July 1906): 9-13

  Goetzman, William H. When the Eagle Screamed: the Romantic Horizon in American Diplomacy 1800-1860. New York: Wiley, 1966

  Gibson, Joe. “A. Butler: What a Scamp!” Journal of the West 11:2 (1972) 235-247

  Graebner, Norman Arthur. “The Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo: Its Background and Formation.” Ph.D. diss., University of Chicago, 1949

  Griffin, Charles Carroll. The United States and the Disruption of the Spanish Empire 1810-1822.  Studies in History, Economics and Public Law No. 429  New York: Columbia University Press 1937. Reprint, New York: Octagon Books, 1974.

  Manning, William R. Early Diplomatic Relations Between The United States and Mexico. Johns Hopkins Press, 1916.  Reprint, New York: Greenwood Press, 1968.

  _____ “Texas and the Boundary Issue 1822-1829” Southwestern Historical Quarterly XVII no. 3 (January 1913): 217-261

  Marshall, Thomas Maitland. A History of the Western Boundary of the Louisiana Purchase 1819-1841.

  Mayo, Bernard. “Apostle of Manifest Destiny” American Mercury 18:72 (1929) 420-426

  Parton, James. Life of Andrew Jackson. New York: Mason Brothers, 1864

  Parton, Dorothy M. “The Diplomatic Career of Joel Roberts Poinsett.” Ph.D. diss., Catholic University of America, 1934

  Peterson, Merrill D. The Great Triumvirate: Webster, Clay, and Calhoun. New York: Oxford University Press, 1987.

  Pletcher, David M. The Diplomacy of Annexation Texas, Oregon, and the Mexican War, Columbia: University of Missouri Press, 1973.

  Putnam, Herbert E. Joel Roberts Poinsett, A Political Biography. Washington: Mimeoform Press, 1935.

  Rather, Emily Zivley. “Recognition of the Republic of Texas by the United States.” Southwestern Historical Quarterly XIII no. 3 (January 1910):

  Remini, Robert V. Andrew Jackson and the Course of American Empire, 1767-1821. New York: Harper & Row, 1977.

  Rippy, J. Fred.  Joel R. Poinsett, Versatile American. Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1935.  Reprint, St. Clair Shores, MI: Scholarly Press, 1970.

  Rives, George L. The United States and Mexico 1821-1848. New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1913.  Reprint, New York: Kraus Reprint Co., 1969.

  Russell, Greg. John Quincy Adams and the Public Virtues of Diplomacy.  Columbia: University of Missouri Press,1995.

  Smith, Justin H. The Annexation of Texas.  New York: Macmillan, 1919

  _____ War With Mexico. New York: Macmillan, 1919

  Stenberg, Richard R. “Jackson’s Neches Claim 1829-1836.” Southwestern Historical Quarterly  XXXIX no. 4 (April 1936):

  _____ “Andrew Jackson and the Ewing Affadavit.” Southwestern Historical Quarterly XLI no. 1 (July 1937):

  _____ “Jackson, Anthony Butler, and Texas.” Southwestern Social Science Quarterly 13:3 (1932) 264-286

  Stille, Charles J. The Life and Services of Joel R. Poinsett, Philadelphia: no publisher, 1888; reprint from “The Pennsylvania Magazine of History and Biography”

  Walker, Henry P. ed. “William McLines Narrative of the Magee-Gutierrez Expedition 1812-1813.” Southwestern Historical Quarterly 66 ( October 1962):234-251

  Ward, Forest E. “Pre-Revolutionary Activity in Brazoria County” Southwestern Historical Quarterly 64 (       ):212-231

  Weeks, William Earl. John Quincy Adams and American Global Empire.  Lexington: University Press of Kentucky 1992.

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