![]() |
![]() |
![]() |
![]() |
![]() |
![]() |
Mary 1st and the Limits of the Counter-Reformation
Christy Monroe
Upon accession to the English
throne, Henry VII worked to secure his legitimacy by establishing an
understanding with the German Habsburgs. The
understanding had much to recommend it at the time because Habsburg power was
growing to encompass Burgundy and soon Spain and its empire.
Indeed, the Habsburg connection became the cornerstone of Henry VII’s
foreign policy. Henry VII was
successful in his own diplomacy, and the alliance withstood even the tumultuous
reigns of Henry VIII and Edward VI. The
marriage of Mary Tudor and Prince Philip of Spain would maintain this
deteriorating alliance tenuously for a few more years.[i]
Henry VIII greatly imperiled relations with the ever-expanding Habsburg
power. His treatment of Catherine
of Aragon, the aunt of Holy Roman Emperor Charles V, was diplomatically
imprudent. He risked alienating the
Emperor and destroying the alliance. Cardinal
Wolsey’s actions against Rome reversed much of the “Anglo-Habsburg
entente.” Henry
VIII’s break with Rome also did much to replace the English hatred of France
with a suspicion of Spain, as England feared a Franco-Habsburg union and a
Catholic attack on England.[ii]
His son Edward VI would show more progress in establishing Protestantism
in England.
Edward
VI’s reign deepened the religious schism as legislation made England
increasingly more Protestant. The
First Act of Uniformity was passed in 1549 and the Protestant Prayer Book became
the only legal book for church services. The
Second Act of Uniformity, passed in 1552, totally abolished the Mass.
Edward issued the Forty-Two Articles in June of 1553 dealing with the
Anabaptists, but primarily directed at the Eucharist and Justification.[iii]
Though Edwardian Protestantism was too harsh for much of the English
population, they remained strongly anti-clerical and anti-papal in the fierce
nationalism Henry VIII had exploited.[iv]
Henry VIII’s foreign policy gradually diminished England’s reputation
on the continent, and during Edward’s reign England played little part on the
continental stage.[v]
John
Dudley, Duke of Northumberland dominated the young king throughout his reign.
Northumberland was the force behind nearly every proclamation Edward
issued. He directed his attention
primarily at consolidating power for himself and schemed to continue his term in
power by placing his fifteen-year-old daughter-in-law Jane Grey on the throne at
Edward’s death. However,
Northumberland underestimated the force with which Mary Tudor, the rightful heir
and eldest daughter of Henry VIII, would claim her place as monarch.
After
the tumultuous nine-day reign of Lady Jane Grey, England welcomed the rightful
Tudor heir to the throne, Mary I. Upon
her accession, Mary had an agenda that would surprise and disappoint her people.
Her sole objective was to return England to Rome.
Her means for achieving her aims did not reflect strong political
judgement. She chose to marry an
unpopular man from a despised nation and bolstered her choice with a string of
persecutions for which history remembers her as “Bloody Mary.”
Mary’s
objectives were thwarted by the very means she used to achieve them.
The persecutions certainly hindered English inclination to re-embrace
Catholicism. Prince Philip of
Spain, Mary’s unfortunate choice for a husband, had his own objectives that
would prove contrary to Mary’s aims. His
own failure in England delivered a disastrous blow to Mary’s reign.
Rather than a solution to the conflicting demands of Mary, Philip, and
others, the marriage was a “fateful poison which threatened to destroy
everyone whose lips it touched.”[vi]
Mary resembled her father and siblings in many ways, especially in the
single-minded pursuit of an objective. The
family resemblance ended, however, when it came to statesmanship.
While Henry, Edward, and Elizabeth all proved themselves to be capable
statesmen, Mary’s temperament created substantial obstacles in establishing
effective policies. Unlike Henry,
she was “personally gentle and inclined to mercy.”[vii]
The ambassador of the Holy Roman Empire, Simon Renard, described her as
“politically naïve.”[viii]
Ruy Gómez de Silva, a favorite courtier of Philip II, acknowledged in
his letters that, while she was a good woman, she was not an able statesman.[ix]
Mary’s limitations were evident at the time of her accession.
Though she enjoyed a warm reception to the throne, the enthusiasm was for
her Tudor blood and did not extend to her Spanish and Catholic policies as she
believed.[x]
She was, in fact, consumed by her mother’s religion and her Spanish
heritage.[xi]
Her foreign policy was more a function of these two factors than of
“English statecraft.”[xii]
Foreign policy during the early years of Mary’s reign was largely
consumed by the question of her marriage. The
marriage of a ruler, often pivotal in political objectives and alliances, is
always a matter of great concern to a nation.
In Mary’s view, marriage was not a simple matter of political
expediency, but a move crucial to the national as well as personal nature of her
religious cause. Marriage, which
became a dominant issue in her reign, had been a dominant issue throughout her
life.
Even as a child Mary looked on marriage as a priority.
Her first betrothal, at the age of two, was to the Dauphin of France,
soon to be King Henri II of France. The
marriage was to take place early, when the infant Dauphin turned fourteen.
Such an alliance between France and England displeased Holy Roman Emperor
Charles V, as it tipped the balance of power on the continent toward France.
Though engaged to a Portuguese Infanta, Charles hinted that he would
marry his cousin, the English princess, “if need be.”
In a secret treaty with Henry, Charles promised to marry Mary when she
turned twelve. Henry and Charles
completed the agreement on August 25, 1521 when Mary was but six years old.
Charles,
however, was not satisfied with Henry’s promise.
As Henry had broken the marriage treaty with France, Charles had no
reason to think he would not do the same again if France countered with a better
offer. In an effort to gain as much as possible in any case, Charles
demanded that Henry deliver the dowry to be used in an invasion of France.
Henry balked at this demand and would only agree if Charles delivered
Francis I, king of France, and helped Henry gain the French crown.
[xiii] Charles
ultimately broke the betrothal himself in 1525.
Both he and Henry had been negotiating secretly, Charles with the
Portuguese Infanta and Henry with James V of Scotland.[xiv]
Upon Mary’s accession to the throne in 1553, the concern for a
suitable match became all the more pressing.
She perceived that the “salvation and public peace seemed to depend on
her bearing a child.”[xv]
For Mary, the alternative to producing an heir was to accept her half
sister Elizabeth as her successor. Elizabeth,
next in line for the throne as designated by Henry VIII, was known to have
Protestant leanings. Mary’s
strong Catholic prejudices led her to believe that England’s return to
Catholicism would “bring salvation to thousands of souls.”
Hence, Elizabeth’s accession would destroy any redemption Mary had
secured for them.[xvi]
The desire to keep any foreign power out of England was a driving force
in the race for a royal husband. Edward
Courtenay, an Englishman of royal blood, emerged as a possible candidate for
marriage. The favorite of Lord
Chancellor Stephen Gardiner, Courtenay had been imprisoned with his family in
the tower at the age of twelve and, therefore, was politically inexperienced.
Mary rejected him not for his political inability, but because his
childish ways irritated her.[xvii]
A second English candidate was Reginald Pole. Mary and Pole had been childhood friends, and Pole’s mother
had been Mary’s governess. The
match was strengthened by Pole’s Plantagenet blood.
Though he was soon to be made a cardinal, a papal dispensation could have
been secured. Pole, however, had no
desire to enter into marriage, nor would Mary have tolerated a reversal of his
Holy Orders.[xviii]
Possible foreign suitors included Don Luis of Portugal, Emmanuel
Philibert of Savoy, and Archduke Ferdinand of Austria.
Each of these men was significantly more
popular
with the English than the fourth and strongest foreign candidate, Charles V’s
son Philip. Although all four were
Habsburg adherents, Philip posed the greatest threat to English independence.
Mary, however, insisted that she would marry a Spaniard.
The Spanish alliance was necessary to the realization of her objectives
and security of any religious progress she may achieve.
Historian Frederick Madden contends that Mary’s principal error was
her deeply rooted faith.[xix]
Nearly every decision she made rested on her religious objectives.
Mary’s primary concern was not for any political or social
ramifications her decision may have, but rather for the rapidity of England’s
return to Catholicism. When Renard
first raised the possibility of marriage to Philip, Mary did question him
regarding the impact such a union may have on England’s diplomatic relations.
The match could damage England’s already precarious relations with
France by allying England with the Habsburg house, France’s enemy.
Mary must also have been aware that her own nation would object to the
marriage for fear that England would fall to Spanish domination.
The marriage also had the potential to encourage the restoration of
Catholicism, which would give many English lords cause to fear the loss of the
lands they had bought from Henry VIII when he confiscated monastic lands to
secure funds and support for his religious reforms.
Despite these concerns, Renard easily assuaged Mary’s fears by
reminding her of the religious triumph she could achieve.
In no way did she disregard the good of her nation, but rather viewed the
reestablishment of Catholicism as the greatest good.
Mary understood marriage as her “religious and patriotic duty.”
For the queen, religious zeal and patriotism were identical; she believed
that a reinstatement of the old religion was best for her country.
She expected marriage to Philip, the pious prince of a strong Catholic
nation, to bolster Catholicism in her own country.[xx]
Thus, of the foreign suitors, only Philip stood a real chance of winning
Mary’s hand. Mary had made it
clear to her cousin, Holy Roman Emperor Charles V, that she wished him to find
her a suitable match, rather than leaving the task to her councilors.
Charles’s choice for Mary was crafted to serve best his own political
designs. He had to meet threats
from France and to contend with Philip’s unpopularity in the Low Countries.
A union between Philip and Mary would check the French king Henri II’s
ambitions in England. Habsburg
power in England would provide a good base from which to control the Low
Countries and protect them from Valois aggression.
The match would strengthen the Spanish Habsburgs over the Austrian
Habsburgs, giving Philip more hope for the imperial crown.
However, should he lose the imperial crown to his cousins, his place as
King of England would be some compensation.[xxi]
For her part, Mary viewed marriage not as a simple alliance, but as a
holy sacrament. She perceived it as
the path to the “resurrection of her country and the salvation of her
people” and expected that it would bring her renown as the savior of England.[xxii]
Charles V cautioned her against such a radical view.
He warned her not to be too quick to pronounce overtly Catholic policies. She should first sound out the public opinion, lest she lose
her cause by alienating the people.[xxiii]
Charles feared that Mary would turn the tide of the people against her
and his own designs in England would be lost.
Mary, however, refused to heed Charles’ advice.
She was far too zealous to relax her agenda for cautionary measures.
In her first declaration on religion in 1553 Mary carefully outlined her
expectations. She assured her subjects that she understood the problems that had
arisen in England due to a “diversity of opinions in question of religion.”
Without stating that she intended to force the nation into Catholicism,
she proclaimed that she would not hide her religion and “so doth her highness
much desire, and would be glad, the same were of all her subjects quietly and
charitably embraced.” While Mary
did not explicitly demand the conversion of the entire nation, she insisted that
everyone “live together in quiet sort and Christian charity” and put a stop
to the “new-found devilish terms of papist or heretic.”
She commanded that there be an end to men interpreting “the word of God
after their own brain.” Regarding
the conspiracy of Northumberland, Mary forbade any individual to take punishment
of the traitors into his own hands, but encouraged her subjects to provide the
government with any information against them.
In closing she cautioned them to heed her commands vigilantly for “her
highness shall be most sorry to have cause to put the same in execution.”[xxiv]
The
marriage between Mary and Philip was of the utmost importance to Charles.
His focus on winning Mary for Philip was so intense that he ordered his
embassy not to mention the marriage directly to Mary for fear that she would
become irritated and turn elsewhere for a husband.[xxv]
Charles’ reasons for arranging the marriage, however, were vastly
different from Mary’s reasons for insisting upon the marriage.
While Mary was acting for what she believed was the good of England,
Charles was acting for his own advancement, though he intended no harm to come
to the English people along the way. While
he certainly understood the need to help Mary achieve her goals in any way
possible, he had additional objectives in mind for the Habsburg cause.
A return to Catholicism was only one of many items on his agenda, and
even so it was to serve as a tool in attaining his other objectives.
Catholicism certainly had a prominent place on the Habsburg agenda, but
that place tended to be political.
For
his part, Philip did not assent to the match eagerly, and his misgivings were
well known throughout Spain. He
agreed only because he was an obedient son and understood the political good the
alliance could mean for his realm.[xxvi]
He wrote to Charles, “I have no other will than that of your Majesty,
and whatever you desire, that I will do.”
As a patriot and politician, Philip placed the political good of his
nation and the Habsburg Empire before his personal interests.[xxvii]
Although
Philip was concerned with the political impact of the match, he was not
insensible to the religious good he had the opportunity to accomplish.
Devoted to his faith, Philip hoped that as he carried out a political
agenda, he could assist the restoration of Catholicism in England. He believed in the “identity of interests between himself
and the Almighty.” Though his
first concern was for his political good, he also desired the religious good
that would necessarily follow.[xxviii]
Throughout his life Philip would devote his energy to “the task of
establishing the universal supremacy of Catholicism in the political interests
of Spain.”[xxix]
Rumors
circulated throughout England that Charles had arranged the marriage in order to
help his situation on the continent.[xxx]
In 1553 Philip had been negotiating a marriage contract with the
Portuguese Infanta Maria but called it off when Mary ascended the throne.[xxxi]
The Portuguese marriage would have provided Philip with the “sinews of
war,” but England offered a better prospect.[xxxii]
For Philip, the marriage was a means to his wider ends.
When it became clear that his objectives were lost, Philip did not
hesitate to abandon Mary and England to attend to his own kingdom.[xxxiii]
Charles
and Philip saw the marriage as an opportunity to strengthen their position
against France. England would be a
powerful Habsburg acquisition in northwest Europe, completing the
“encirclement of France.”[xxxiv]
Philip complained to his father of the condition that English councilors
placed on the marriage stipulating that he could not involve England in the war
with France. Since there was no request to overturn this condition,
Charles and Renard were apparently convinced that they could sway Mary once the
marriage was completed. Insistence
that Philip be allowed to involve England in the war was too likely to betray
their intentions and turn Mary against the match.
Charles’
interests led him to prevent Cardinal Reginald Pole, recently appointed papal
legate to England, from leaving the continent.
Charles and Philip knew that the English would resist the religious
upheaval Pole intended to institute. The
public was likely to associate Pole’s reforms with the recent marriage, which
may damage Habsburg political interests if the religious reforms went badly.
Charles did not wish Pole to enter England until he had convinced him to
tread softly about the issue of religion. Renard had to explain Pole’s absence
as Charles’ concern that the marriage should be settled before any other
issues could be considered. After
the marriage was completed Charles had no excuse for detaining Pole further
without arousing suspicion. Pole
entered England in November of 1554.[xxxv]
Charles
and Philip no doubt knew the good the marriage symbolized to Mary.
Renard was certainly aware of her hopes and made them clear in his
correspondence to Charles.[xxxvi]
But the Emperor’s aims were not congruent with the Queen’s.
Should Mary ever discover his true objectives, Charles feared that she
would turn on him and all would be lost. Renard
was, therefore, charged with presenting the Emperor’s aims in such a way that
Mary would not become suspicious while negotiations for the marriage took place.
He disguised the emperor’s intents by giving them a religious slant.
At the same time, he had to insure that he did not create a commotion
among the people, always a danger when dealing with religious subjects in
England.[xxxvii]
Philip
and his advisors had no part in the marriage negotiations.
Instead, Mary, her most prominent councilors, and even Antoine de
Noailles, the French ambassador to England, contributed sections, while Renard
was responsible for the final drafting.[xxxviii]
The drafters made an effort to assuage the fears of the English people by
including sections regarding the power Philip would have and the relationship
England would have with Spain and the Habsburg Empire.
According to the contract, Mary was to be the sole monarch and Philip was
not to have any power. He would
certainly not retain the crown or title should Mary die.
His only hope for official power in England was as regent for any child
Mary may bear. To further insure
that Spain would not exert any power over England, the treaty stipulated that no
foreigner was to hold office. By
denying Philip the crown and Spaniards official positions, England’s autonomy
appeared more secure.[xxxix]
The
treaty also specified that Philip was not to involve England in the war with
France. It read, “the Realme of
Englande, by occasion of this matrimonie, shall not dyrectlie or indirectlie be
entangled with the warre that is now betwist [Charles] and [Henri].”[xl]
The English fear that Charles and Philip would involve them in war was
one of the most serious and pressing objections to the alliance.
Gardiner hoped that this explicit provision would prevent Philip from
exploiting English arms and funds. Noailles
no doubt hoped that it would prevent too much weight thrown to the Habsburg
camp. Many Englishmen, however, had little faith in imperial
promises and thus little hope of any success in the union.[xli]
The
prospects of the English alliance did not look so hopeful after Philip learned
the conditions of the contract.[xlii]
The English council had done their duty well by negotiating a treaty that
would “induce most of the political nation to accept the marriage.”[xliii]
Renard, for his part, had not accomplished so much for Philip in the
treaty. He could only give Charles
and Philip hope that after the marriage they could pressure Mary to have the
terms of the treaty nullified.[xliv]
Nonetheless, the treaty was signed January 12, 1554 and proclaimed three
days later.
Opposition to the Marriage
Not only was Mary’s marriage a matter of great concern in England, but
it also received wide international attention.
All of Europe recognized that her marriage to Philip could dramatically
shift the balance of power on the continent.
France feared that this union promised added strength to the Burgundian
house. In the event of war with the
Habsburgs, the marriage would insure English support of Spain.[xlv]
Noailles believed, no doubt as did Philip and Charles, that upon the
marriage depended “the fate not only of England, but of all Europe as well.”[xlvi]
Though Spaniards recognized the strategic value of a union with England,
their reaction to the treaty was rather unfavorable.
Their pride was wounded by the many concessions to the English and the
exclusion of Philip’s advisors in drafting the treaty.
They perceived it as disinheriting Don Carlos, Philip’s son by a
previous marriage. They resented
the qualification that Philip bring only “honest servants” to England, the
implication being that there were dishonest Spaniards and that Philip would have
them in his service even if there were.[xlvii]
The
English reaction was also unfavorable. This
opposition was rooted in Philip’s status as the queen’s husband.
Because Mary was England’s first queen in her own right, the role her
husband would play was uncertain; there was no precedent to establish how much
power Philip would have.[xlviii]
The possibility that Philip would rule both England and Spain led the
English to consider the risk of becoming a mere Spanish colony.
The English fear was that Mary’s marriage to Philip would devastate the
nation by dragging England into the war on the continent.
The fact that Philip was a foreigner especially disturbed Mary’s
fiercely nationalistic subjects. They
looked to the Low Countries “whose liberty had been bartered away simply by
marriage alliances.”[xlix]
The possibility of becoming a mere Spanish colony had precedent in the
plight of the Low Countries.
The
strongest opposition came from Mary’s own council.
The council was deeply divided with one faction surrounding Gardiner and
one surrounding Paget. Gardiner
emerged as the leader of the Catholic faction due to his reputation as the
“one man able to combat the influence of Pole and of Spain.”[l]
His faction wanted England to stand alone and, thus, opposed any
foreigner. Paget’s faction,
composed mainly of nobles and civil servants, did not believe that England could
survive independently. They believed Spain to be the least dangerous ally and a
better choice because it was England’s traditional friend.[li]
Gardiner
objected to Philip on political grounds rather than religious grounds.[lii]
He recognized Charles’s objectives in the proposed match.
Though Renard had successfully disguised the Emperor’s intentions when
discussing the matter with Mary, Gardiner was not so easily persuaded.
Nor was he convinced by rumors of “imminent peace on the continent”
that had seemed temporarily to pacify the people.[liii]
He contended that the marriage would embroil England unnecessarily in war
with France and “invite French intrigue with English heretics.”[liv]
As for the Emperor’s promise of aid in religious affairs, the decidedly
nationalistic Gardiner was content to reestablish the old religion without
external interference. He was also
keenly aware that the alliance would increase Habsburg dominion and French
antagonism. Thus far, England had
derived its security from its “independent position as arbiter between France
and Spain.” This advantage would
be destroyed by an alliance with either of the continental powers.[lv]
Gardiner ultimately accepted Philip, not because he approved, but because
to continue his opposition would anger Mary and cost him the leadership of the
council.[lvi]
Paget
was no less patriotic than Gardiner. His
alliance with the Emperor was due largely to his own ambition.
If Charles should threaten English independence or Paget’s ambitions,
he would no doubt abandon the Spanish camp.[lvii]
He had successfully served Henry VIII, Edward VI, and Mary, each reign
requiring a shift in approach to remain in power.
Paget’s faction was concerned with England’s survival, not with
reestablishing Catholicism or increasing Habsburg power.
Still, Paget, Charles, and Mary banded together to secure the Queen’s
marriage to Philip. Though they
emerged successful from the marriage debate, they would soon find their causes
to be at odds.
The
English population itself posed a serious threat to the marriage.
In their vying for power, it was clear to Renard and Noailles that the
English government was not absolute. The
public was a “third entity,” alongside the Council and Parliament.
It is clear that the public had considerable power and acted as an
“independent element in English politics.”[lviii]
Noailles resorted to stirring up discontent as his principal tactic.
Renard took pains to spread rumors that he believed would quell the fears
of the general population.
The
House of Commons officially protested the marriage.[lix]
Concerned for their liberty and the independence of their country, a
party of twenty men met with Mary and begged her not to marry a foreigner.
Mary’s response was harsh: “For
your desire to see us married…we thank you.
Your desire to dictate to us the consort whom we will choose we consider
somewhat superfluous. The English
Parliament has not been wont to use such language to its sovereigns…”[lx]
Wyatt’s
Rebellion
Wyatt’s Rebellion was a manifestation of the opposition to Mary’s
proposed marriage. The conditions
at the time were favorable for rebellion. Northumberland’s
domination of the young Edward VI had initiated a decline in respect for royal
and conciliar authority as well as a heightened association between high
political offices and “greed, religious radicalism, and subservience to a
foreigner.” Political factions
increased as effective royal authority declined.
Religious tensions, introduced during the reign of Henry VIII and
heightened under the reformations of Edward VI, augmented existing factions.[lxi]
The rebels participating in Wyatt’s Rebellion, though representative
of English opposition, were comprised of the handful of men who could afford to
resist openly. Catholic adversaries
of the marriage were torn between a devotion to Mary and their faith and a
deep-seated hatred of Spain. These
men did not want to resort to violence to combat a Spanish invasion because it
could too easily become an attack on Mary and on Catholicism.
A number of powerful nobles who had bought lands that Henry VIII had
confiscated from the monasteries feared that Spanish intervention in the
religious issue would insure the loss of these lands.
Open rebellion, however, was a more immediate danger to their land and
power.
The opponents of the marriage most inclined to rebellion were a handful
of gentlemen who had associated with each other during Edward’s reign.
They did not have as much at stake as many nobles and were not devoted to
Mary’s religion. Though generally inclined to Protestantism, these men
rebelled for political rather than religious reasons.
The conspiracy against the marriage found its roots in secular matters
more than religious matters.[lxii]
The original plan included four popular uprisings led by prominent men
from each area. Sir Peter Carew was
to take the lead in Devon, the Duke of Suffolk in Leicestershire, Sir James
Croftes in Herefordshire, and Sir Thomas Wyatt in Kent.
Only Wyatt’s rebellion met with any success.
Carew lacked sufficient resources, Suffolk lacked support, and Croftes’
rising never came to be at all.[lxiii]
The aim of the rebellion was to depose Mary and place Elizabeth and
Courtenay on the throne. Although
Elizabeth had not committed herself to the rebellion or to Courtenay, the
conspirators presumed that upon their success Elizabeth would do her duty by
assuming the throne and marrying Courtenay.[lxiv]
The rebellion had been scheduled to coincide with Philip’s arrival in
England; the conspirators were to keep him from setting foot on English soil.
Wyatt gathered his forces at Allington, explaining to officials that they
were assembled for “thimpeachment of the marriage.”
Mary sent messengers to press Wyatt for the true reason for the assembly. The Queen’s message indicated that she would discuss the
matter with Wyatt, though the message was not sincere but a device to force
Wyatt’s plot into the open. Wyatt,
however, dismissed the messengers with no response.[lxv]
Wyatt did not share the true intentions of the conspiracy with the men
he had gathered. He led them “to
believe that they were taking part in a spontaneous and nation-wide outburst to
rescue the Queen from the consequences of evil counsel and her own folly.”
Wyatt claimed nothing more than patriotic resistance to Spain.[lxvi]
Aware of the threat the assembly posed, Mary again made a generous offer.
She offered a committee that would meet to discuss the rebels’
grievances and pardon for anyone who would return home within twenty-four hours.
In return Wyatt demanded “custody of the Tower and the Queen’s person
as a hostage.” Indignant at such
a demand, Mary determined that the rebellion should be put down by military
force.[lxvii]
Wyatt planned to attack London by surprise on the north bank.
He hoped that his friends in the city would open the gates to him if he
could approach undetected. His
hopes were probably well-founded. The
government’s greatest fear regarding the rebellion was its suspicion that
Londoners were generally sympathetic to Wyatt’s cause.
Pole later suggested that Wyatt was repulsed because the people feared
that he would sack the city, not because they despised his cause.[lxviii]
Wyatt did not succeed in arriving undetected. The city was awakened in the early hours of the morning to
find that Wyatt was almost upon them. Mary’s
advisors begged her to flee, but her resolution was so strong that “mayny
thought she wolde have ben in felde in person.”[lxix]
The royal soldiers met Wyatt at Ludgate.
Rumors circulated at court throughout the day, some declaring that Wyatt
was victorious and that the Queen’s forces had defected.
Soon, however, news of Wyatt’s retreat was confirmed.
The royal soldiers pursued the rebels and convinced Wyatt to surrender,
taking him prisoner.[lxx]
Mary and Gardiner drew an important lesson from the incident, namely
that “heresy, not patriotism, was the prime root of sedition in England.”[lxxi]
This was not, however, the point the conspirators had intended to make.
In fact, Wyatt received little support from Protestants rebelling for
religious purposes.[lxxii]
After his capture, Sir Peter Carew, one of the rebellion’s leaders,
said that he had wanted only “to serve his country and help his country from
bondage.”[lxxiii]
Because Mary understood the marriage in religious terms, she understood
resistance to it in religious terms. She
saw the traitors as heretics who feared the prospect of being subject to a
Catholic government rather than as Englishmen who feared the prospect of being
subject to a foreign government. The incident fed Mary and Gardiner’s desire to stamp out
heresy by whatever means necessary. Their
understanding of Wyatt’s Rebellion and the general English resistance would
impede their ability to scotch opposition to Philip. Instead, they only drove it underground and intensified it.[lxxiv]
Mary’s failed understanding of English resistance would ultimately mean
the collapse of Habsburg interests in England and of Mary’s own objectives.
Once
marriage negotiations were completed, Renard and Charles presented Philip with
the task of actualizing the Habsburg objectives in England.
The Anglo-Spanish alliance was still only a potential threat to France.
The Habsburg position could not advance unless Philip could persuade Mary
to assist him against France.
Based
on Charles and Renard’s extensive negotiations with England, Philip had
observed that the best course of action was slow and methodical.
Early in the marriage he tried to keep out of domestic politics.
He declined to interfere publicly, but devoted his attention to gaining
the favor of several members of the council.[lxxv]
Although
Philip’s intentions in England were those of his father, he realized that he
would have to make himself acceptable to his wife and to her government.
His first goal had to be the restoration of Catholicism.
Once he had returned England to the “papal fold” Habsburg dominion
would be complete, for the Church was under Habsburg influence.[lxxvi]
He would then have a double hold on England, one through Mary and one
through the Church.
England officially returned to the papal fold on November 30, 1554.
The restoration, however, did not come without a struggle, nor was it
neatly achieved by a ceremony. Several
sessions of Parliament were necessary to complete the reversal of Protestant
reforms. The Parliament of 1553
agreed to repeal only the reforms enacted during the reign of Edward VI.[lxxvii]
The following year Parliament again declined to repeal Henrican statutes
until they had been assured that there would be no attempt to restore the
monastic lands Henry VIII had confiscated from the Church and sold to the
nobility. On November 28, 1554
Cardinal Reginald Pole addressed the Houses of Lords and Commons, encouraging
them to repeal laws and statutes adding to the break between the Catholic Church
and England. Though the motion
carried “almost by acclamation,” the acts for dissolution of the monasteries
were notably missing in the list of repealed acts.[lxxviii]
This session of Parliament reenacted heresy laws, passed new treason
laws, and repealed anti-papal and anti-ecclesiastical laws passed since 1529.[lxxix]
English
nobles wanted the return to be a negotiation between Parliament and the papacy.
Ecclesiastical adherents wanted it to be by papal authority.
Though Charles was strongly in favor of returning England to Rome, he
preferred to accomplish the restoration through negotiations.
He was keenly aware of the tensions surrounding a return to the Catholic
Church.[lxxx]
Return by negotiation is evident in Parliament’s refusal to repeal
Henrican reforms until the issue of monastic lands was settled.
The
return to Catholicism engendered resistance from many nobles who had acquired
monastic lands from Henry VIII. By
the Acts of Dissolution in 1536 and 1539, Henry VIII had confiscated church
lands and distributed them among the nobility, thereby raising a large amount of
money for the royal coffers and creating a constituency for his reforms.
The government realized the tensions in this subject.
To return the land to the church would confront organized opposition
among some of the most powerful nobles who had considerable investments in the
land. To insure a smooth return to
Catholicism and, hence, the success of the Tudor-Habsburg alliance, Mary would
have to confirm the nobility’s possession of the land.[lxxxi]
Renard and Charles could not afford to risk open discontent.
Charles’s instructions to Renard had been that the marriage should
occur only if it could be completed without threat of rebellion.
Renard knew that returning the lands would endanger the marriage, which
he had worked so hard to secure.
Mary’s
desire to return England to Catholicism led her to urge a total reversal of any
action that had damaged relations with the papacy.
Out of bitterness towards Paget who had usurped Mary’s favor and in an
effort to block the Habsburgs in England, Gardiner made many attempts to pass
stringent religious bills in addition to repealing anti-Catholic statutes.
Renard supported Paget in blocking the bills that “might arouse popular
opposition,” for he feared that they might endanger Philip and the Habsburg
objectives.[lxxxii]
The general population, already suspicious of Philip, would be likely to
identify
him with any unpopular religious bills. The
return of church lands was among the bills most likely to “arouse popular
opposition.” Pope Julius III, as
well as others in the Catholic camp, did not want to allow the lay nobility to
retain the land Henry had given them. This
would give the impression that they had gotten England back at a price.
Renard
was aware that a complete reversal of the dissolution was a political
impossibility. In order to secure a peaceful restoration of the old religion, he
contended that, while the issue of the land was pressing, theological issues
should be of more concern.[lxxxiii]
Charles managed to detain Pole in Brussels until he could be sure that
the Pope would not support complete restoration of the lands.
He wanted the issue settled by Mary and her councilors before Pole
crossed to England. Pole was only
to confirm agreements, not negotiate.[lxxxiv]
Charles’ dealings with Pole exhibit his desire to return England to
Rome by negotiation in order to achieve a smooth transition.
To salvage the religious possibility, Philip and Charles dealt with the
restoration in a political manner.
In
London, rumors began to circulate that the monasteries were to regain their land
and that the clergy planned to take advantage of their strengthened position to
get their revenge. The rumor
continued to suggest that these vengeful clergymen would be “backed by Spanish
steel,” thus reinforcing the negative association between Spain and
Catholicism.[lxxxv]
Nobles became increasingly agitated over the possibility of losing their
lands. General discontent regarding
Spanish presence continued. As
tensions heightened, it became increasingly evident that the return to Rome must
be completed soon. Much of the
people’s edginess was perceived to be a result of the uncertainty of the
matter. Ultimately the pope relented and agreed that the lands could
remain in the hands of the lay nobility.[lxxxvi]
Philip
did not rely solely on the religious issue and diplomatic tactics to accomplish
his goals. He also hoped for an
heir to the throne. Three additional means of advancing his objectives would open
if Mary produced an heir. First,
although the marriage treaty specifically forbade it, Philip stood a better
chance of being coronated if there were an heir to the throne. His coronation had been forbidden in the treaty because the
English feared the prospect of a foreigner ascending the throne after Mary’s
death. If Mary produced an heir,
there would be no chance of Philip ascending the throne after Mary’s death.
Secondly, an heir might enable the religious issue to be pushed through
more easily. One cause of the
English resistance of Catholicism was that they identified it with foreign
domination. If the royal line
appeared secure within England, the fear that either Rome or Spain would
dominate England would be less prevalent. The
final advantage for Philip was that a child would calm English tensions.
The English would be more inclined to accept Philip if they were not
continually afraid that he would try to convert England into a Spanish colony.
Any designs Philip may have for the throne would be easier to resist if
there were a legitimate heir. For
his part, Philip was less concerned with seizing the throne for himself than
with calming English tensions.[lxxxvii]
He hoped that by shifting popular opinion to his favor he could secure
English cooperation in his endeavors in France.
Philip
began more overt measures after some attempts to improve his position in
England. Planning on future English
assistance against France, he questioned the council on the state of the English
navy. Upon learning that the fleet
was not seaworthy, he warned the council of the need to have a seaworthy fleet
that could be available at a moment’s notice.
He wrote to them, “England’s chief defense depends upon its navy
always being in good order to serve for the defense of the kingdom against all
invasion. It should not only be fit
for sea, but instantly available.”[lxxxviii]
On
March 20, 1557 Philip began to press Mary for military support against France.
Mary, possessing a strong sense of duty, saw it as her obligation to
support her husband against the judgement of her council.[lxxxix]
She was able to convince her council to permit that which was expressly
forbidden in the marriage treaty. Philip
embroiled England into the Habsburg conflict with France.[xc]
England
declared war on France June 7, 1557, and eight thousand troops prepared to join
Philip in Flanders under the command of Emmanuel Philibert, Duke of Savoy.
Savoy
began false attacks on frontier fortresses in France with the intention of
turning suddenly to St. Quentin, which he knew to be nearly defenseless.
Though the French discovered his design, reinforcements were unable to
prepare a defense in time. The
French
troops were completely routed, and Savoy finally took St. Quentin on August 27.
Philip divided his army, which consisted of his own Spaniards, German
mercenaries, and English soldiers, among the towns he had taken across France.
The English troops, grudging allies anyway, were appalled at the bloody
devastation after the battle of St. Quentin and disgruntled with the Spanish
complaints of English behavior. They
demanded leave to return home, thus depriving Philip of any further English
military assistance.[xci]
When
Philip had traveled in Flanders and Germany in1549, his demeanor had made him
extraordinarily unpopular with the people.
He did not speak a word of German, nor did he make any attempt to learn.
He did not attempt to conceal his contempt for their proceedings, which
he found undignified, or for their customs, which he found disgusting.[xcii]
Anxious to avoid a repeat of the situation, Charles ordered his son to
behave better in England. In an effort to insure that the Spanish reputation in England
would not suffer, Charles asked Fernando Alvarez de Toledo, Duke of Alba, to act
as a model Spaniard while he accompanied Philip in England.
Alba, however, was an extraordinarily poor choice as his brusque manner
earned him the antipathy of everyone at the English court, just as it had in the
Low Countries. In fact, Philip was easily more popular than Alba and may
have fared better without such a model.[xciii]
Philip
was not, however, suited to the role he would need to take on in England.
The situation demanded more charisma than Philip could command.
He was stiff and formal, and the language barrier hardly endeared him to
the English-speaking people.[xciv]
Renard helped the prince tremendously in writing a guide instructing him
in basic behavior. He reminded Philip to be gracious, to learn at least a few
words of English, and not to interfere in domestic affairs.[xcv]
Despite Renard’s advice and Philip’s efforts, he was still unable to
satisfy the English court.
The
English aversion to Philip was not of a personal nature; they did not want him
in England him because he was the Spanish monarch.[xcvi]
Although Philip generally refrained from interfering in English policy as
they had feared, Englishmen still refused to accept him.
He was “hateful to the simple and virulent nationalism of the
English.”[xcvii]
It did not matter what he did, just that he was not English.
Spanish
presence aroused English resentment. The
Venetian ambassador commented that Philip would have been more loved had he
gotten rid of the Spaniards around him.[xcviii]
Ruy Gómez de Silva spoke freely of Philip’s unhappiness and his plans
to leave the country. Certainly the English resented that Philip would find their
country so unpleasant.[xcix]
Mary relied heavily on Renard, a symbol of Spanish and Habsburg dominance
in England, over Gardiner and Paget. Members
of the government began to resent Spanish domination of the Queen and council.[c]
Many Englishmen cooked up plots to eradicate Spanish presence in
England. One scheme was to
slaughter all Spaniards in the palace, and any Englishman hosting a Spaniard in
his home was to kill him that same night. Another
plan was to kill all Spaniards at a royal contest.
Both plots were uncovered and prevented before any violence could break
out.[ci]
Only Wyatt’s Rebellion, which occurred before Philip and his courtiers
actually arrived in England, was actually carried out.
After the rebellion was put down, Mary lost no time in adding a fiery
speech in which she assured the rebels that she would not marry Philip without
Parliament’s consent. If they
would not approve it, she said, then she would simply not marry.
The English fear and hatred of Spain was temporarily overcome by a
patriotic love for he Tudor blood.[cii]
If Mary did not marry, it was certain that she would not bear a child.
Such a threat was too reminiscent of the relatively recent War of the
Roses. Without an heir, England
could potentially be thrown into a dynastic crisis.
Once
Spaniards began to arrive in England, they were badly treated.
Brawls at court were frequent and brutal, often severely wounding or
killing participants.[ciii]
Londoners attacked the Count of Egmont and his company in the street.[civ]
Ambassadors from Spain arrived to ratify the union of Mary and Charles
but were “pelted in the streets, ‘so hateful was the sight.’”[cv]
On January 1, 1554, boys descended upon the forerunners of the imperial
embassy with snowballs.[cvi]
For the whole period of the Spanish stay in England, Spanish priests
would not go out in their clerical robes for fear of the treatment they would
receive. One Spaniard wrote that
“the English are so bad and fear God so little that they handle the friars
shamefully…[they] tried to tear the cloaks off the backs of Don Pedro de
Cordova and Don Antonio…asking what they meant by wearing crosses and jeering
at them.”[cvii]
Though
in the first years of his marriage Philip did not attempt to entangle England in
any Spanish or Habsburg politics, he further damaged his increasingly precarious
position in 1557 when he requested English aid in Spain’s war with France.
Though the marriage treaty expressly forbade English involvement, Philip
pressed Mary for assistance. It had
become clear that the council would not nullify the terms of the marriage
contract, and Philip could not afford to put off his request any longer as his
position grew more precarious by the day. This
request could not have helped Spanish unpopularity in England, but only
increased the fear that Spain would exhaust English resources and force the
nation into a colonial position.
Spanish
Impressions of England
Renard
summed up the Spanish perception of the English in a letter to Egmont in 1554.
He called them a “faithless and lawless folk, uncertain in religion,
shifty and inconstant, of a jealous nature, haters of strangers, and old
detesters of all authority, even that of English princes.”[cviii]
The Spanish were as miserable in England as the English were having them
there. Spanish ambassadors who had
arrived ahead of Philip met on January 2, 1554 “with silence and gloom”
after surviving the attack from boys with snowballs the day before.[cix]
One
courtier who arrived with Philip complained in a letter to a friend at Salamanca
that the Englishmen were “certainly more like Frenchmen than Spaniards.”[cx]
Given the state of Franco-Spanish relations at the time, this sentiment
was certainly intended to be derogatory. In
the same letter, the courtier, indignant at the lack of English loyalty to the
emperor, lamented that the English did not care about Flanders and would not
care “if the Low Countries were lost, and the emperor with them.”
In his own loyalty to Charles and Philip he failed to consider that the
English nation had only artificial ties to the Habsburgs and therefore no
inclination to loyalty. He
complained of extensive robberies and other crimes against Spaniards, accusing
the councilors of knowing, yet doing nothing to stop such behavior.[cxi]
Spanish
resentment toward the English mounted when Philip arrived with his courtiers.
Most of the three thousand Castilians who accompanied Philip to England
were not present at the wedding because they had been left along the way to
London. Many Spanish nobles “felt
slighted” that some of Mary’s household “had usurped their customary
duties at Philip’s side.”[cxii]
In addition, it was difficult for Spaniards to secure lodging.
“For the English are not satisfied with preventing them from serving
the King,” wrote the Spanish courtier to his friend at Salamanca, “but must
inflict other miseries upon them. The
English hate us Spaniards worse than they hate the Devil, and treat us
accordingly.”[cxiii]
To
Spanish complaints of poor treatment, Philip responded that they must not
protest, but “put up in silence with all the provocations of the English.”[cxiv]
In an effort to prevent violent outbursts between Spaniards and
Englishmen, Philip proclaimed that any Spaniard to use his weapon would lose his
right hand and anyone to cry “Spain!” would be hanged.[cxv]
The need for such a declaration indicates that conflicts must have been a
problem. Philip’s means of ending
such conflicts must only have served to further the Spanish sense of oppression.
Thus, the Spanish courtier complained that Englishmen, knowing of
Philip’s proclamation, “ill-treat us without fear.”[cxvi]
The
Spanish also complained of an English lack of faith.
They refer to the English as a “godless folk” who were not at all
“firm in matters of faith.” Their
view of Mary, however, was more favorable.
They called her “a perfect saint” and praised her for “beginning to
set matters right.”[cxvii]
There is little doubt that aside from her firmness in faith, the Spanish
did not favor the marriage for any reasons other than political ones.[cxviii]
Though members of the court may have observed Philip and Mary to be the
“happiest couple in the world,” the comment was far from true.
Both Englishmen and Spaniards generally understood that love was not a
part of this marriage.[cxix]
Mary may have found Philip more attractive than he found her, but
conscious of his behavior, Philip always acted as a gentleman, never hinting
that he found Mary undesirable.[cxx]
The nature of Philip and Mary’s personal relationship is perhaps best
indicated in the fact that they never produced a child even though Mary had used
the need for an heir as a lever to gain English consent to the marriage.
Though the reason Mary never conceived may have been sterility, it is
important to note that Philip stayed in England only as long as he deemed
necessary for Mary to conceive.
Though
Mary intended her marriage to Philip in part to foster Catholicism, she found
that it only increased English xenophobia.
The Spanish presence taught them to view Spain, not France, as the
national enemy.[cxxi]
They looked upon Philip’s entourage as invaders, rather than allies.
The marriage itself, however, did not cause the conflict between the two
peoples. Rather, it tended to
“embitter feelings already widespread.”[cxxii]
Aside from Philip and his courtiers, there was little Spanish presence
in England. The Society of Jesus,
Spanish in origin, was conspicuously excluded from the orders allowed to return
to England, demonstrating the antipathy England harbored toward Spain.
Mary’s accession to the throne had piqued the interest of the founder,
Ignatius, in establishing a mission in England.
Surely this strongly Catholic monarch would be eager to install Jesuits
in England to assist in the re-Catholicization of England.
Mary’s betrothal to Philip also gave Ignatius hope since Philip had
granted permission for the Jesuit college at Louvain.[cxxiii]
Much to Ignatius’ surprise, however, while Mary restored several
religious orders in England, she did not permit the entrance of the newly
founded Jesuits.
For some time Ignatius had championed Pole as a “patron of the
Society.”[cxxiv]
Pole had pressured Mary of Hungary to allow a Jesuit college at the
University of Louvain, the same college that Philip later permitted.[cxxv]
Pole had once declared his belief that England needed preachers to secure
reconversion, but he gradually became convinced of the need for strong leaders
instead. Pressure from Charles and Philip was certainly a dominant
factor in Pole’s change of attitude toward the Society of Jesus.
Although the Jesuits would have provided England with strong preachers,
they simply did not fit the need for strong leaders.[cxxvi]
Once “patron of the Society,” Pole began to advise Jesuits stationed
in Ireland of possible danger to their persons and suggested that they leave at
the first hint of trouble.[cxxvii]
He certainly realized that they would become likely targets for English
demonstrations of hatred for Spanish and Catholic elements in their society.
Even during Pole’s service as papal legate to England, he extended no
request for Jesuit assistance.
Mary’s exact reasons for excluding the Jesuits are unknown.
Since English Catholics could freely practice their religion under Mary,
they had no “need to look toward Europe.”
Her efforts to restore Catholicism did not include any of the
counter-Reformation reforms Pope Paul III had instituted.
She wished to restore the ancient order and the Society of Jesus, founded
in 1540, was not a part of that rite.[cxxviii]
Cardinal Pole recognized England’s growing distaste for Spain and
wished to lessen the association between Catholicism and Spain as much as
possible.[cxxix]
Mary’s pro-Catholic policies, her marriage to Philip, and Pole’s
assignment to England had given Ignatius such hope that he planned a new
administrative unit and prepared Bernard Oliver for the assignment.[cxxx]
But the invitation never came. Queen
Mary simply did not want Jesuits in England.[cxxxi]
The English aversion to Spain disappointed Ignatius’ hopes for an
English mission.
Mary
managed to thwart her own objectives through the very means she intended to
achieve them. Her natural tendency
towards clemency proved a major factor in her political failure.
She was the most merciful Tudor in matters of treason, crimes that were
dangerous to the country and to herself. She
proved the most severe, however, in matters of heresy.
Renard and Charles advocated the policy “to deal strictly with the
traitor and to spare the heretic.” Mary
preferred exactly the opposite. She
did not subject all conspirators to the harsh measures Renard advocated.
She spared all but two of Northumberland’s followers.
Such clemency initially gained her popularity.
Her popularity failed, however, when her mercy did not extend to
Protestants.[cxxxii]
Mary
began the persecutions with encouragement from Bonner and Gardiner.
She viewed Protestants, heretics in her eyes, to be more dangerous than
traitors. Mary perceived
Protestants as a threat to the salvation of the nation.
Since the salvation of all English people was her sole intent, she viewed
these “heretics” as a greater and more real threat than traitors who simply
wished to depose her. Threats to
her life and reign were simply threats; threats to English conversion were an
actual presence that would have to be eradicated before she could attain her
purpose as queen. The first
execution in her process of eradication took place in February of 1555.
Three hundred more would occur before Mary’s death in 1558.
By
executing Protestants, however, Mary managed to strengthen the English hatred of
the Pope and Catholicism. Rather
than ridding the nation of “heretics” and alleviating the “poison” with
which England had been injected, the persecutions set the England staunchly
against any possibility of conversion. This
vigorous hatred of Catholicism and the papacy became “one of the most marked
characteristics of the English people for some 350 years.”[cxxxiii]
Mary’s
failure to produce an heir greatly damaged anything she may have accomplished
during her reign. She experienced hysterical pregnancies twice during her
reign, in which she exhibited all the signs of pregnancy without ever having
conceived a child. Without an heir,
Mary could be sure that England would revert to Protestantism at her death with
the accession of her half sister Elizabeth.
The
council on which Mary relied so heavily was but another source of weakness of
her reign. The fact that the
council had considerable power over the queen proved to be an obstacle for Mary
in achieving her objectives. The
council had been largely responsible for raising Mary to the throne by throwing
popular support to her instead of to Lady Jane Grey.
Thus, the council had significant power over her.[cxxxiv]
Observing this point, a Spanish courtier wrote that “the King and queen
have no more authority in this realm than if they were vassals, for the
Councilors govern, and are lords of the kingdom, and even of the King and
Queen.”[cxxxv]
The council’s power proved problematic due to its size and wide range
of objectives among the councilors. It
became a stumbling block for both Mary and Philip.
The
council was large and often deeply divided.
Renard wrote to Charles that the divisions only continued to grow, and
Paget would not even attend meetings because of his “enmity for the chancellor
and other councilors.”[cxxxvi]
Renard suggested to Mary that she reduce its size in order to eliminate
some of the existing factions but was later forced to write to Charles that a
reduction was impossible because “it created too much bad feeling between the
old and recent members of the Privy Council.”[cxxxvii]
The historian Ann Weikel posits, however, that the conciliar factions
have been exaggerated. Division within the council has been based largely on
Renard’s reports to Charles V. Weikel
suggests that Renard may have distorted factions to serve his own interests.
Perhaps Renard believed he could more easily control a smaller council,
and thereby more easily control Mary.[cxxxviii]
Though the possibility exists that Renard exaggerated the state of the
government, evidence for conciliar factions is stronger.
The
third Parliament under Mary also reflected problems in her government.
Mary had requested that men of the “wise, grave, and Catholic sort”
be sent to participate. This effort
to pack Parliament proved futile. The
third session reflected the middle class by restoring the relationship with the
Papacy without restoring Church lands, by protecting the monarchy from feuds
over the regency without crowning Philip, and by refusing (for a time) to be
dragged into the war on the continent. It
was unconcerned with Mary’s desires to restore Church lands and to aid Philip
in his requests. The third
Parliament proved that attempts to pack the House of Commons were useless
“when Crown and Council had not one, but many conflicting objectives to
pursue.”[cxxxix]
Mary
had hoped that her marriage to Philip would assist her in achieving England’s
return to Rome. Philip was to be the king of the most powerful Catholic
nation, and his father was the Holy Roman Emperor.
Both were faithful Catholics. Mary
hoped that such connections would reinforce Catholicism in England.
Her fatal miscalculation was not in choosing a Catholic husband, but in
choosing a husband from such a powerful nation.
She underestimated the ferocity of her nation’s reaction to a foreign
marriage, and to a Spanish marriage in particular.
In addition, Mary misunderstood Charles and Philip’s purposes.
She had believed that they would devote themselves entirely to advancing
Catholicism, not realizing that they may have additional objectives.
Mary’s priorities and Habsburg priorities proved incompatible given the
force of English opposition.
Although
the marriage treaty expressly forbade it, Philip managed to acquire English
military and financial support against France through Mary’s intercession.
This support drained England financially.
The English fear of becoming a Spanish colony proved true.
England was unwillingly embroiled in a financially devastating war in
which they had no stake.[cxl]
The loss of Calais in January of 1558 “destroyed the last vestige of
loyalty to [Mary],” as it had been the last English holding on the continent.
[cxli]
Much of the blame fell to Mary, as she had convinced the council to
permit English involvement. The loss especially embittered the English, for it would
never have been in danger without Philip’s intervention. There was suspicion that Philip had purposely let France
capture Calais with the intention of retaking it later for his own.
The Treaty of Cateau-Cambrésis, which settled the Franco-Spanish war on
April 2, 1559, did not give any consideration to English interests; Philip did
not even make an attempt to restore Calais to England, thus indicating to the
English that he was utterly unconcerned for England.[cxlii]
Calais was proof that the English wariness of a foreign marriage had been
justified. Reservations regarding
Philip and Charles’ intentions for England in respect to France had been
accurate. Against the will of the
greater part of her nation, Mary had insisted on marrying Philip and, in so
doing, had cost the English people finances, Calais, and their independence.
After
the Protestant persecutions and the war in France, Mary could never hope to
accomplish a return to Catholicism. Any
authority she may have once possessed was utterly lost.
Mary, so popular in 1553, became one of the most hated monarchs in
English history, earning the title “Bloody Mary.”
The
Habsburgs did not fare any better in achieving their objectives than Mary had.
Spaniards lamented Philip’s obvious loss in England.
A Spanish courtier wrote that he had been assured in Castille that
“once his Highness was King of England we would lord it over France; and the
very opposite has happened, for the French are stronger than ever.”[cxliii]
Persecutions were a large part of Habsburg failure, just as they had been
a part of Mary’s failure. Spanish
presence in England grew more dangerous as Protestant executions began, for the
English suspected Spaniards of instigating the persecutions.
Though the persecutions were initiated, or at least encouraged, by Bonner
and Gardiner, it was all too tempting for Englishmen to associate the
persecutions with Spain.[cxliv]
Spaniards,
for their part, were horrified by the course of action Mary had chosen.
Philip and Charles objected to the persecution because it worked against
their political objectives by inducing the people to detest Mary as well as the
Spaniards and increasing the hatred of Imperial and Spanish presence.[cxlv]
They also objected to the persecutions out of a concern for the
reinstatement of Catholicism. They recognized that such harsh measures would greatly hinder
restoration. Renard wrote of the
dangers in allowing the persecutions to continue. It would, he warned Philip, prove dangerous to Mary and
Philip and would mean the “cause of religion be again menaced.” He advised Philip that if Mary would not consent to end the
persecutions, then a less public means should be considered.[cxlvi]
After Philip spoke to Mary with these objections the persecutions ended,
though only temporarily. In the
bloodless interval Renard wrote to Charles begging him to keep Philip from
leaving England as they had planned. He
feared that persecutions would recommence as soon as Philip was gone.[cxlvii]
Spanish priests spoke out against Mary’s means of “conversion.”
Philip’s own confessor “denounced them at the pulpit” probably at
Philip’s insistence, or at least with his approval.
By “active intercession” Philip saved many condemned men.[cxlviii]
Despite
Spanish resistance to the persecutions, their presence in England was even more
dangerous than it had been at their arrival.
The persecutions, though strictly at the initiative and approval of
Englishmen and denounced vigorously by Spaniards, reflected badly on the Spain
since their arrival and the beginning of the persecutions had nearly coincided. With so much working against them, Philip and Charles had
little hope of succeeding in their mission.
Renard worked endlessly in attempts to salvage the efforts he had made in
arranging the match. As Mary
executed more Protestants, Philip, Charles and Renard watched their prospects in
England fade.
Though
the persecutions were a large factor in the failure of Philip and Charles’
objectives, several other elements played a role.
Charles had accepted the marriage treaty with all its unfavorable terms
because he had hoped that Philip would be able to persuade Mary and the council
to nullify many of them.[cxlix]
He was successful in reversing certain elements of the treaty, such as
acquiring English support in the war with France.
He was
not,
however, able to persuade Parliament to grant him the crown.
He was not even able to obtain regency when Mary’s pregnancy was
announced.[cl]
Perhaps if a child had been born Philip would have stood a better chance
at retaining a foothold in England. The
lack of an heir damaged his prospects. Such
a failure to gain power in England was surely a blow to Habsburg aims.
The
few Spanish counselors who remained in England were unable to operate.
They possessed only a “shaky understanding of English politics” and
suffered extraordinary unpopularity. Only
Renard and Philip had the queen’s ear, making her the “only effective
instrument of Habsburg influence.”[cli]
In addition, Habsburg diplomacy began to crumble from within.
Tensions developed between Philip’s subjects and Charles’ subjects,
damaging Habsburg unity.[clii]
Any political operations the Habsburgs attempted in England were futile
and ineffective.
When
Philip began to indicate his desire to leave England, Renard wrote letter upon
letter to both Charles and Philip. Besides
his pleas regarding the persecutions, Renard insisted that the administration be
settled and public peace restored before Philip left.
Without these measures, everything they had hoped for out of the marriage
would be utterly lost. If Philip
would take steps to restore at least some of the damage that had been done, it
was possible that Renard could salvage some political good from the union.[cliii]
In 1555, having lost all hope of an heir, Philip finally left England for
Flanders.[cliv]
By
1557 Philip was concerned that his position in England was growing too shaky to
put off his request for English assistance in France.
His only hope for English support was to convince Mary of her duty to
help him. Having left her in England, Philip ran the risk of losing any
influence he may have retained. His
claim on her duties as his wife grew less plausible with every day he spent away
from England. The call for aid, of
course, made him all the more unpopular with the English.
What little support he had received in England had come largely from the
middle class. As the religious issue had been settled, however, and the
focus turned toward the continent, the middle class had begun to fear the
effects war would have on trade, and Philip’s slim support waned dramatically.[clv]
When the English soldiers demanded leave to return home, Philip was far
too unsure of his position to deny them permission.[clvi]
Having received unwilling assistance, suffered defeat after defeat in
France, and lost Calais, every vestige of hope Philip had in England through
Mary was destroyed. He turned his hopes from his sterile wife to the promising
Elizabeth who was sure to ascend the throne shortly.
Conclusion
By
1558 it had become clear that Mary’s fragile health was quickly failing her.
Political and personal pressures had taken their toll.
Overwhelmed by a second hysterical pregnancy and the burden of political
and religious failure, Mary died on November 17 after a reign that “was, in
every way, marked by a note of sterility.”[clvii]
Upon her death, Philip, who had not been in England in three years, did
not return to pay respects to his wife. Rather,
he sent as his representative the Count of Feria whose first action was to
“propitiate the coming queen,” Mary’s young half sister Elizabeth.[clviii]
Throughout his dealings with England, Philip had always been careful to
pay special attention to Elizabeth. He
had hoped that he could arrange a marriage between Elizabeth and the Duke of
Savoy to insure the continuation of the Spanish connection with England.[clix]
Philip’s actions at the time of Mary’s death further indicate the
political nature of the marriage in his eyes.
Indeed he was never personally attached to Mary.
His interest in Elizabeth betrayed his political interests.
By
the end of Mary’s reign, it was clear that opposition to the marriage had been
justified. It led directly to
Wyatt’s Rebellion and indirectly to the loss of Calais.[clx]
Mary’s lack of statesmanship is clear in her inability to recognize the
obvious consequences of the marriage alliance with Spain.
She did not perceive the danger to English independence.
Blinded by the force of her religious zeal and Spanish heritage, she
trusted Renard and Charles implicitly, failing to see through their disguise of
imperial objectives. She did not
foresee that Philip’s influence over her would be credited with the
persecutions, with the result that “Catholicism and Spanish tyranny became all
but synonymous.”[clxi]
Not only did the marriage play a major role in shaping the national character of England, but it also played a major role in the history of the rest of the continent. The marriage alliance affected the course of the war between the Habsburg Empire and France. Though its success could have meant a great victory for the Habsburgs and devastation for France, its failure brought hope to France and disappointment to the Habsburgs. The poor state of Anglo-Spanish relations during the marriage impaired the Habsburg play for complete domination of Europe. Though France had feared that the marriage would strengthen the Habsburg power, its political failure actually served to strengthen the French position.
Although the English dreaded the potential effects of the marriage, many
anticipated benefits should the union succeed. Ambitious government officials seized the chance to advance
their careers. Catholic clergymen
anticipated a full restoration of their previous powers and prerogatives.
The outcome, however, disappointed all and ruined many.
Mary died broken-hearted at having failed in the full restoration of
Catholicism. Philip witnessed a
severe setback of his position on the continent.
Paget and Gardiner, among others, suffered serious blows to their
careers. The marriage, once full of
promise, was not sufficient in itself. Conflicting
objectives insured failure for all. Without
unity of purpose, a simple marriage alliance could not fulfill so many agendas.
[i] G.R. Elton, England Under the Tudors, vol. 4 of A History of England, ed. Charles Oman (London: Methuen & Co. Ltd., 1955), 215.
[ii] Whitney R.D. Jones, The Mid-Tudor Crisis: 1539-1563 (New York: Harper & Row Publishers, Inc., 1973), 149, 151.
[iii]
Ken Powell and Chris Cook, English Historical Facts (Totowa: Rowman
and Littlefield,
1977), 115-116.
[iv] Elton, England Under the Tudors, 219-220.
[v] Ibid., 215.
[vi] E. Harris Harbison, Rival Ambassadors at the Court of Queen Mary, (Freeport: Books for Libraries Press, 1940), 199.
[vii] Elton, England Under the Tudors, 214. Mary’s clemency tended to be toward those who were a threat to her person and throne rather than toward those who were a threat to her religion. For further discussion see p 46 below and Harbison, Rival Ambassadors, 67-68.
[viii] Simon Renard to Bishop of Arras, 9 September 1553, Calendar of State Papers, Spanish, vol. XI, quoted in Pogson, “The Legacy of the Schism: Confusion Continuity and Change in the Marian Clergy,” in The Mid-Tudor Polity c. 1540-1560, ed. Robert Tittler and Jennifer Loach (Totowa: Rowman and Littlefield, 1980) , 121.
[ix] Harbison, Rival Ambassadors, 200.
[x] Pogson, “The Legacy of the Schism,” 121.
[xi] Elton, England Under the Tudors, 214.
[xii] Jones, Mid-Tudor Crisis, 169.
[xiii] Thornton Cook, Royal Marys: Princess Mary and Her Predecessors (Freeport: Books For Libraries Press, Inc., 1930) , 65-71, 94.
[xiv]
H.F.M. Prescott, Mary Tudor (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1953) ,
96.
[xv] Harbison, Rival Ambassadors, 66.
[xvi] Martin A.S. Hume, Philip II of Spain (New York: A.L. Burt Company, Publishers, 1903) , 47,50.
[xvii] Harbison, Rival Ambassadors, 58.
[xviii] Elton, England Under the Tudors, 215.
[xix] Frederick Madden, Privy Purse Expenses of the Princess Mary, Daughter of King Henry the Eighth, Afterwards Queen Mary: With a Memoir of the Princess, and Notes (London: William Pickering, 1831) , xvii.
[xx] Harbison, Rival Ambassadors, 66.
[xxi] Ibid., 58-59.
[xxii] Hume, King Philip II of Spain, 50.
[xxiii] Ibid., 45.
[xxiv]
Mary I, First proclamation on religion, 18 August, 1553, Bonner’s
Register, 402, quoted in David C. Douglas, ed., English Historical
Documents, vol. 5, 1485-1558, ed. by C.H. Williams (New York:
Oxford University Press, 1967) , 858-860.
[xxv] Harbison, Rival Ambassadors, 70-71.
[xxvi] James M. Boyden, The Courtier and the King: Ruy Gómez de Silva, Philip II, and the Court of Spain (Berkley: The University of California Press, 1995) , 40.
[xxvii] Hume, King Philip II of Spain, 46-47.
[xxviii] Ibid., 47, 59.
[xxix] Ibid., 10.
[xxx] Harbison, Rival Ambassadors, 189.
[xxxi] Boyden, The Courtier and the King, 40.
[xxxii] Hume, King Philip II of Spain, 43.
[xxxiii] J.D. Mackie, The Earlier Tudors: 1485-1558, The Oxford History of England, ed. Sir George Clark, no. 7 (Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1962) , 554.
[xxxiv] Geoffrey Parker, The Grand Strategy of Philip II (London: Yale University Press, 1998) , 147.
[xxxv] Harbison, Rival Ambassadors, 198-199.
[xxxvi] Hume, King Philip II of Spain, 47.
[xxxvii] Harbison, Rival Ambassadors, 66-69, 89.
[xxxviii] Ibid., 99.
[xxxix] Elton, England Under the Tudors, 218; and Allen B. Hinds, The Making of the England of Elizabeth (London: Rivington, Percival and Co., 1895) , 117.
[xl] Harbison, Rival Ambassadors, 102.
[xli] Mackie, Earlier Tudors, 537.
[xlii] Hume, King Philip II of Spain, 47.
[xliii] Ann Weikel, “The Marian Council Revisited”, 60 in Mid-Tudor Polity, ed. Tittler and Loach.
[xliv] Hume, King Philip II of Spain, 51.
[xlv] Harbison, Rival Ambassadors, 60.
[xlvi] Ibid., 57.
[xlvii] Ibid., 100, 106, 197.
[xlviii] The Empress Matilda (b.1102, d.1164) ruled in her own right for eight months though she was never strong enough to call herself queen. Stephen challenged her rule, won the contest, and ruled until his death at which time Matilda’s son Henry obtained the throne. Mary, then, was in a precarious position. Not only was there no precedent for a female monarch, there was precedent for the failure of a female monarch.
[xlix] Hinds, The Making of the England of Elizabeth, 69.
[l] Elton, England Under the Tudors, 221.
[li] Harbison, Rival Ambassadors, 62.
[lii] Ibid.
[liii] Ibid., 78.
[liv] Ibid., 90-91.
[lv] Hinds, The Making of the England of Elizabeth, 69.
[lvi] Wiekel, “The Marian Council,” 58.
[lvii] Harbison, Rival Ambassadors, 62-63.
[lviii] Harbison prefaces his discussion of the force of popular opinion with the note that, as of 1940, no careful study of how popular opinion was formed or how it influenced statesmen. Popular opinion regarding political issues belonged to a narrow segment of the population. The term refers less to peasants than to educated men who were not members of the court or council. Harbison, Rival Ambassadors, 60-64.
[lix] Elton, England Under the Tudors, 217.
[lx] Hinds, The Making of the England of Elizabeth, 114-115. Hinds does not cite his source for Mary’s words. Though the exact wording of Mary’s response may be of question, G.R. Elton also mentions Mary’s response, the content being the same. See also Elton, England Under the Tudors, 217.
[lxi] Harbison, Rival Ambassadors, 109.
[lxii]
David Loades, Two Tudor Conspiracies (Cambridge: The University
Press, 1965) , 17.
[lxiii] Ibid., 25-44.
[lxiv] Harbison, Rival Ambassadors, 113-114, 116.
[lxv] State Papers Domestic, Mary, vol. II, no.9, quoted in Loades, Two Tudor Conspiracies, 53.
[lxvi] Loades, Two Tudor Conspiracies, 54.
[lxvii] Ibid., 65.
[lxviii] Ibid., 69-70.
[lxix] J.G. Nicholas, The Chronicles of Queen Jane, Camden Society, 48, quoted in Loades, Two Tudor Conspiracies, 71.
[lxx] Loades, Two Tudor Conspiracies, 73.
[lxxi] Harbison, Rival Ambassadors, 169.
[lxxii] Powell and Cook, English Historical Facts, 116.
[lxxiii] Harbison, Rival Ambassadors, 125-126, 114.
[lxxiv] Ibid., 93.
[lxxv] Hume, King Philip II of Spain, 51.
[lxxvi] Ibid., 51.
[lxxvii] Elton, England Under the Tudors, 218-219.
[lxxviii] Hume, Philip II of Spain, 54.
[lxxix] Elton, England Under the Tudors, 219.
[lxxx] Harbison, Rival Ambassadors, 205.
[lxxxi] Ibid., 199.
[lxxxii] Ibid., 170.
[lxxxiii] Ibid., 204.
[lxxxiv] Ibid., 207.
[lxxxv] Ibid., 205.
[lxxxvi] Ibid., 199.
[lxxxvii] Ibid., 206-207.
[lxxxviii] Hume, King Philip II of Spain, 60. One must wonder if Philip recalled this advice when the English fleet defeated the Spanish Armada in 1588.
[lxxxix] Elton, England Under the Tudors, 221.
[xc] Hume, King Philip II of Spain, 71.
[xci] Kamen, Philip of Spain, 69-70.
[xcii] Hume, King Philip II of Spain, 38-39.
[xciii] Boyden, The Courtier and the King, 43-44.
[xciv] Harbison, Rival Ambassadors, 196-197.
[xcv] Ibid., 184-185. As a precaution, Renard also suggested that the members of Philip’s court bring soldiers disguised as pages (since the presence of Spanish soldiers in England was expressly forbidden in the marriage treaty).
[xcvi] Hume, Philip II of Spain, 48-49.
[xcvii] Elton, England Under the Tudors, 221.
[xcviii] Kamen, Philip of Spain, 62.
[xcix] Harbison, Rival Ambassadors, 203.
[c] Ibid., 127, 175.
[ci] Ibid., 197-198.
[cii] Hinds, The Making of the England of Elizabeth, 71.
[ciii] Ibid., 109.
[civ] Hume, Philip II of Spain, 47.
[cv] Cook, Royal Marys, 111.
[cvi] Mackie, The Earlier Tudors, 537.
[cvii] Spanish courtier to a friend at Salamanca, in Pascual de Gayangos, Viage de Felippe II en Inglaterra, (Madrid, 1877), quoted in Douglas, English Historical Documents, 209; and Hume, Philip II of Spain, 55.
[cviii] Renard to Egmont, 8 March, 1554, Pubic Record Office, transcrpits of Royall Tyler, 206, quoted in Harbison, Rival Ambassadors, 64.
[cix] Mackie, The Earlier Tudors, 537.
[cx] Gayangos, Viage de Felippe II, quoted in Douglas, English Historical Documents, 208-209.
[cxi] Henry Kamen, Philip of Spain (London: Yale University Press, 1997) , 58.
[cxii] Boyden, The Courtier and the King, 41.
[cxiii] Gayangos, Viage de Felippe II, quoted in Douglas, English Historical Documents, 208.
[cxiv] Ibid., 208.
[cxv] Hinds, The Making of the England of Elizabeth, 110.
[cxvi] Gayangos, Viage de Felippe II, quoted in Douglas, English Historical Documents, 208.
[cxvii] Ibid., 207-208.
[cxviii] Ibid., 207; and Hume, Philip II of Spain, 50.
[cxix] Kamen, Philip of Spain, 59.
[cxx] Hume, Philip II of Spain, 51.
[cxxi] Elton, England Under the Tudors, 223.
[cxxii] Hinds, The Making of the England of Elizabeth, 140.
[cxxiii] Thomas M. McCoog, The Society of Jesus in Ireland, Scotland, and England 1541-1588: ‘Our Way of Proceeding?’ Studies in Medieval and Reformation Thought, Heiko A. Oberman ed., no. 60 (New York: E.J. Brill, 1996) , 28-29.
[cxxiv] Ibid., 26.
[cxxv] Ibid., 28.
[cxxvi] Ibid., 39.
[cxxvii] Ibid., 19.
[cxxviii] Ibid., 24; and Bernard Basset, The English Jesuits, from Campion to Martindale (New York: Herder and Herder, 1967) , 14.
[cxxix] McCoog, Our Way of Proceeding, 39.
[cxxx] Ibid., 29.
[cxxxi] Ibid., 13-14, 30.
[cxxxii] Harbison, Rival Ambassadors, 67-68.
[cxxxiii] Elton, England Under the Tudors, 220.
[cxxxiv] Hume, King Philip II of Spain, 51.
[cxxxv] Gayangos, Viage de Felippe II, quoted in Douglas, English Historical Documents, 209..
[cxxxvi] Renard to Charles, 10 February, 1555 and 27 March, 1555, in Spanish Calendar of State Papers, vol. XIII, quoted in G.R. Elton, The Tudor Constitution: Documents and Commentary (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1962) , 100.
[cxxxvii] Harbison, Rival Ambassadors, 226; and Renard to Charles, 23 November, 1554, in Spanish Calendar of State Papers, vol. XIII, quoted in Elton, Tudor Constitution, 99.
[cxxxviii] Wiekel, “The Marian Council,” 60.
[cxxxix] Harbison, Rival Ambassadors, 215, 222.
[cxl] Elton, England Under the Tudors, 222.
[cxli] Ibid., 222.
[cxlii] Mackie, Earlier Tudors, 559-560.
[cxliii] Gayangos, Viage de Felippe II, quoted in Douglas, English Historical Documents, 208.
[cxliv] Hume, King Philip II of Spain, 55.
[cxlv] Elton, England Under the Tudors, 220.
[cxlvi] Renard to Philip, 5 February, 1555, in Spanish Calendar of State Papers, vol. XIII, quoted in Douglas, English Historical Documents, 839.
[cxlvii] Kamen, Philip of Spain, 62; and Harbison, Rival Ambassadors, 224.
[cxlviii] Hume, King Philip II of Spain, 55-56; and Kamen, Philip of Spain, 62.
[cxlix] Hume, King Philip II of Spain, 51.
[cl] Ibid., 55.
[cli] Boyden, The Courtier and the King, 58.
[clii] Harbison, Rival Ambassadors, 203.
[cliii] Ibid., 225.
[cliv] Hume, King Philip II of Spain, 56.
[clv] Harbison, Rival Ambassadors, 221.
[clvi] Hume, King Philip II of Spain, 74.
[clvii] Elton, England Under the Tudors, 214.
[clviii] Hume, King Philip II of Spain, 80-81.
[clix] Parker, Grand Strategy of Philip II, 148.
[clx] Weikel, “The Marian Council,” 52.
[clxi] Hinds, The Making of the England of Elizabeth, 141.
Bibliography
Primary Sources
Secondary
Sources
Boyden,
James M. The Courtier and the King: Ruy Gómez de Avila, Philip II, and the
Court of Spain. Berkley: The University of California Press,
1955.
Cook,
Thornton. Royal Marys: Princess Mary and her Predecessors. Freeport:
Books for
Libraries Press, Inc., 1930.
Elton,
G.R. England Under the Tudors, vol. 4. A History of England, ed.
Charles Oman.
London: Methuen & Co. Ltd, 1955.
Harbison,
E. Harris. Rival Ambassadors at the Court of Queen Mary. Freeport: Books
for
Libraries Press, 1940.
Hinds,
Allen B. The Making of the England of Elizabeth. London: Rivington,
Percival &
Co., 1895.
Hume,
Martin A.S. Philip II of Spain. New
York: A.L. Burt Company, Publishers, 1903.
Innes,
Arthur D. England Under the Tudors. New York: G.P. Putnam’s Sons, 1911.
Jones,
Whitney R.D. The Mid-Tudor Crisis: 1539-1563. New York: Harper & Row
Publishers, Inc., 1973.
Kamen,
Henry. Philip of Spain.
London: Yale University Press, 1997.
Loades,
David. Politics and Nation: England 1450-1660. 5 ed. Oxford: Blackwell
Publishers, 1999.
________.
Tudor Government: Structures of Authority in the Sixteenth Century.
Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 1997.
________.
Two Tudor Conspiracies. Cambridge:
The University Press, 1965.
Lockyer,
Roger. Tudor and Stuart Britain: 1471-1714. 2d ed. London: Longman Group
Limited, 1985.
Lofts,
Norah. Queens of England. Garden City: Doubleday & Company, Inc.,
1977.
Mackie,
J.D. The Earlier Tudors: 1485-1558. The Oxford History of England, ed.
Sir
George Clark, no.7. Oxford: The Clarendon Press,
1962.
Madden,
Frederick. Privy Purse Expenses of the Princess Mary, Daughter of King Henry
the Eighth, Afterward Queen Mary: With A Memoir of
the Princess Mary, and
Notes. London: William Pickering, 1831.
McCoog,
Thomas M., ed. The Reckoned Expense, Edmund Campion and the Jesuits.
Woodbridge: The Boydell Press, 1996.
________.
The Society of Jesus in Ireland, Scotland, and England, 1541-1588:
‘Our Way of Proceeding?’.
Studies in Medieval and Reformation Thought, ed.
Heiko A. Oberman, no.60. New York: E.J. Brill, 1996.
Merriman,
John. A History of Modern Europe. Vol.1. New York: W.W. Norton &
Company, 1996.
Parker,
Geoffrey. The Grand Strategy of
Philip II. London: Yale
University Press, 1998.
Powell,
Ken and Chris Cook. English Historical Facts. Totowa: Rowman and
Littlefield,
1977.
Prescott,
H.F.M. Mary Tudor. New York:
The Macmillan Company, 1953.
Prescott,
William H. History of the Reign of Philip the Second, King of Spain. Vol.
1.
London: George Routledge and Sons, n.d.
Stone,
J.M. The History of Mary I, Queen of England. London: Sands & Co.,
1901.
Tittler,
Robert, and Jennifer Loach, eds. The Mid-Tudor Polity c. 1540-1560.
Totowa:
Rowman and Littlefield, 1980.
Trease,
Geoffrey. The Seven Queens of England. New York: Vanguard Press, Inc.,
1953.
Weir, Alison. The Children of Henry VIII. New York: Ballantine Books, 1996.